Proposed Submission Core Strategy

Policy IM2 starts by setting out a general statement to the effect that the infrastructure needed to serve new development should be provided by that development. On a case by case basis, this is obviously common practice, and is achieved through the normal development control basis.

Paragraph 19.17 of the supporting text notes that to comply with PPS12, the Core Strategy needs to demonstrate that the essential infrastructure required to deliver the Spatial Strategy as a whole can be delivered, but the Core Strategy is in fact largely silent on the overall strategic infrastructure requirement.

Paragraph 19.18 states that Appendix 4 of the Core Strategy sets out an Infrastructure Schedule, but no such schedule exists, and Appendix 4 is actually an appendix on Design Principles.

Policy IM2 and its supporting text therefore relies solely on the separate Infrastructure Delivery Plan to explain the strategic infrastructure requirements, but this is a document not forming part of the Core Strategy and therefore technically not part of the Examination, and it is also a 'live' document which is subject to change. As a result, the Core Strategy itself fails to explain anywhere what the essential infrastructure is, or link this in any justified or meaningful way to the Spatial Strategy.

The Infrastructure Delivery Plan (IDP) itself provides an interesting discussion around various potential infrastructure requirements, but it is frequently inconclusive in terms of what might be required. The discussion, for example, in relation to strategic and local health facilities on pages 43 and 44 provides a good example, where the outcome of the IDP essentially appears to be "don't know" and the result is Policy CO2 which refers generally to meeting future health needs should they arise, without any assessment or knowledge as to what these may be.

Many of the topic areas in the IDP are similarly inconclusive, and therefore do not translate either in to effective policies are clear position statements as to the implications of that infrastructure on the development strategy.

Elsewhere, the IDP does appear to come to firm conclusions as to the need for specific items of infrastructure, but there is no evidence to substantiate the conclusion, with the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road being a good example.

Furthermore, even where the IDP does identify specific items of infrastructure, there is no explanation as to what the effective limitation on the Spatial Strategy is without that infrastructure in place. Again, the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road is a good example. It is identified as being of 'high' importance, but the IDP does not specify the practical effects of it not being delivered, and indeed from Policies such as OSS2 (iii) (b) it is apparent that the Council do not as yet know the effects, since this part of Policy BX3 makes clear that in the absence of the Link Road, the assessment has yet to be done as to the scale of development that might otherwise be achieved.

On a point of clarity, the IDP states at section 9 (page 13) that part of its purpose is to clearly identify what is 'critical' as opposed to 'desirable' infrastructure, but then the subsequent use of the terms 'high', 'medium' and 'low' to describe the importance of infrastructure serves to obscure the distinction between critical and desirable items.

Throughout the IDP, we would question the manner in which the Council has applied the 'high', 'medium' and 'low' terminology. For example, the second item on infrastructure (sustainable modes of travel) lists Bexhill Real Time passenger information as one part of a package of measures, all of which are identified as being 'high'. Does that mean that if there is no Real Time passenger information, all development in Bexhill must stop, because of a lack of "critical" infrastructure?

Under the next item, a Glyne Gap railway station is identified as being of "medium" importance, but there is no real explanation as to whether this is actually 'critical' or 'desirable' infrastructure, and when one consults the IDP text on this item (see para 13.21 on page 27), it appears that there is in fact very little likelihood of such a scheme ever being delivered.

Another key concern with the IDP is the large number of items where the costs and funding arrangements are "TBC", which therefore provides no clarity at all as to whether the required infrastructure would be delivered.

It would be somewhat tedious to go through the schedules in the IDP in line by line detail, but in addition to the above, the most obvious concern is that the IDP does not, in fact, explain the consequential relationship between the specific items of infrastructure and the delivery of the Spatial Strategy, and without this clear 'cause and effect' linkage, the IDP cannot provide any confidence that the Core Strategy is deliverable.

In our view, it is at least in part because the Core Strategy has failed to set out clear and justified 'triggers' for infrastructure delivery that the strategy has been so heavily influenced by the perceived constraints in highways infrastructure associated with the Council's promotion of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road.

Having regard to the above, we consider that Policy IM2, coupled with the lack of a clear infrastructure delivery assessment setting out the critical thresholds and requirements for infrastructure, render the Core Strategy unsound in terms of being both Effective and consistent with National Policy, whilst in addition, many of the IDP entries appear unjustified.

Policy IM2 starts by setting out a general statement to the effect that the infrastructure needed to serve new development should be provided by that development. On a case by case basis, this is obviously common practice, and is achieved through the normal development control basis.

Paragraph 19.17 of the supporting text notes that to comply with PPS12, the Core Strategy needs to demonstrate that the essential infrastructure required to deliver the Spatial Strategy as a whole can be delivered, but the Core Strategy is in fact largely silent on the overall strategic infrastructure requirement.

Paragraph 19.18 states that Appendix 4 of the Core Strategy sets out an Infrastructure Schedule, but no such schedule exists, and Appendix 4 is actually an appendix on Design Principles.

Policy IM2 and its supporting text therefore relies solely on the separate Infrastructure Delivery Plan to explain the strategic infrastructure requirements, but this is a document not forming part of the Core Strategy and therefore technically not part of the Examination, and it is also a 'live' document which is subject to change. As a result, the Core Strategy itself fails to explain anywhere what the essential infrastructure is, or link this in any justified or meaningful way to the Spatial Strategy.

The Infrastructure Delivery Plan (IDP) itself provides an interesting discussion around various potential infrastructure requirements, but it is frequently inconclusive in terms of what might be required. The discussion, for example, in relation to strategic and local health facilities on pages 43 and 44 provides a good example, where the outcome of the IDP essentially appears to be "don't know" and the result is Policy CO2 which refers generally to meeting future health needs should they arise, without any assessment or knowledge as to what these may be.

Many of the topic areas in the IDP are similarly inconclusive, and therefore do not translate either in to effective policies are clear position statements as to the implications of that infrastructure on the development strategy.

Elsewhere, the IDP does appear to come to firm conclusions as to the need for specific items of infrastructure, but there is no evidence to substantiate the conclusion, with the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road being a good example.

Furthermore, even where the IDP does identify specific items of infrastructure, there is no explanation as to what the effective limitation on the Spatial Strategy is without that infrastructure in place. Again, the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road is a good example. It is identified as being of 'high' importance, but the IDP does not specify the practical effects of it not being delivered, and indeed from Policies such as OSS2 (iii) (b) it is apparent that the Council do not as yet know the effects, since this part of Policy BX3 makes clear that in the absence of the Link Road, the assessment has yet to be done as to the scale of development that might otherwise be achieved.

On a point of clarity, the IDP states at section 9 (page 13) that part of its purpose is to clearly identify what is 'critical' as opposed to 'desirable' infrastructure, but then the subsequent use of the terms 'high', 'medium' and 'low' to describe the importance of infrastructure serves to obscure the distinction between critical and desirable items.

Throughout the IDP, we would question the manner in which the Council has applied the 'high', 'medium' and 'low' terminology. For example, the second item on infrastructure (sustainable modes of travel) lists Bexhill Real Time passenger information as one part of a package of measures, all of which are identified as being 'high'. Does that mean that if there is no Real Time passenger information, all development in Bexhill must stop, because of a lack of "critical" infrastructure?

Under the next item, a Glyne Gap railway station is identified as being of "medium" importance, but there is no real explanation as to whether this is actually 'critical' or 'desirable' infrastructure, and when one consults the IDP text on this item (see para 13.21 on page 27), it appears that there is in fact very little likelihood of such a scheme ever being delivered.

Another key concern with the IDP is the large number of items where the costs and funding arrangements are "TBC", which therefore provides no clarity at all as to whether the required infrastructure would be delivered.

It would be somewhat tedious to go through the schedules in the IDP in line by line detail, but in addition to the above, the most obvious concern is that the IDP does not, in fact, explain the consequential relationship between the specific items of infrastructure and the delivery of the Spatial Strategy, and without this clear 'cause and effect' linkage, the IDP cannot provide any confidence that the Core Strategy is deliverable.

In our view, it is at least in part because the Core Strategy has failed to set out clear and justified 'triggers' for infrastructure delivery that the strategy has been so heavily influenced by the perceived constraints in highways infrastructure associated with the Council's promotion of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road.

Having regard to the above, we consider that Policy IM2, coupled with the lack of a clear infrastructure delivery assessment setting out the critical thresholds and requirements for infrastructure, render the Core Strategy unsound in terms of being both Effective and consistent with National Policy, whilst in addition, many of the IDP entries appear unjustified.

That the Council has undertaken a Sustainability Appraisal is not in doubt, since
there is a June 2011 document that bears that label, but we do question, in the
light of the many specific comments raised in this submission, whether or not the
Sustainability Appraisal presented is of the standard necessary to meet the
requirements of Article 12(2) of the Directive, which seeks to ensure that
environmental reports are of a "sufficient quality".

As summarised by Mr Justice Collins in the Forest Heath case:

"Quality involves ensuring that a report is based on proper information and
expertise and covers all of the potential effects of the plan or programme
in question. In addition, since one of the purposes of the Directive is to
allow members of the public to be consulted about plans or programmes
which may affect them, the report should enable them to understand why
the proposals are said to be environmentally sound."

As presented, the Sustainability Appraisal of this Core Strategy falls well short of
the quality required, both in terms of its technical assessment (in particular in
respect of Options B, C and D) and in respect of the presentation of its findings.

We have limited our analysis of the SA to the assessment of Options B, C and D, since they are the issues in which we have greatest interest. The lack of comment on other parts of the SA does not mean that we agree with the findings or the analysis, simply that we have not subjected it to the same level of scrutiny.

Firstly, we are concerned at the lack of clarity in the SA regarding the substance of the options tested. The SA is a self-contained document, and in theory at least the findings of the SA process should inform the substance of the Core Strategy, notwithstanding that the production of the two documents may occur in tandem. It is essential therefore that a reader of the SA has a clear understanding of what is being assessed, and on what basis the assessment has taken place.

In many instances, the definition of the options presented in the SA is vague or obscure. So for example in respect of issue B and the overall scale of growth, it is firstly apparent that "growth" in this context only means "housing numbers", and secondly that the description of the two different variants is not consistent. Option B1 relates to a specific and quantifiable level of housing development over a set period (5,600 between 2006-2026), whilst Option B2 refers to a much vaguer alternative of "a lower rate of development ... in recognition of changed circumstances."

There is no clarity in the SA itself as to what the 'lower rate of development' or the changed circumstances are. Although it may well be that the 'lower rate' assessed is the rate of development proposed in the Core Strategy, there is no clarity in the SA of what has been assessed against what.

Similarly, in respect of Option C, the SA provides three alternatives that speak of a "focus" of new development at different locations, but the SA does not define what this means in practice. Are the quantums of development envisaged under the variants the same, or does a "focus" at North Bexhill mean something different to a "focus" at North-East Bexhill? Does "focus" mean all non-committed development is ascribed to those locations for just a proportion, and if the latter, what proportion?

In respect of Option D, we are unclear as to why no reference is made to Option D in the summary on pages 47-50, which means the only information relating to this option is buried in the SA on pages 136 and 137. Again, there is a contrast between the description of the rejected option D1, which refers to continuing the scale and rate of development set out in the previous iteration of the Core Strategy (which although not quoted in the SA, is a quantifiable figure), and the preferred Option D2 which assesses an unspecified "lower rate of development".

It may well be that a diligent reader can deduce from reading the current Core Strategy and previous iterations of the Core Strategy what the difference between Options D1 and D2 might be, but taken at face value, the SA document provides the reader with no information as to the alternatives being assessed or the real difference between them, and therefore it fails in its duty to present the environmental analysis in a manner which is easy to understand, and moreover in a manner which is clear and unambiguous.

Turning then secondly to the substance of the analysis of the options presented in the relevant tables (pages 131-132 for the 'B' options, 133-135 for the 'C' options, and 136-137 for the 'D' options), we are concerned that the quality of the analysis presented falls well short of the standard for such a document. The following specific points illustrate our concerns.

Option B comments

The difference between Option B1 and B2 is that option B1 provides more dwellings that Option B2 (although as per the above, the actual difference is not clear from the SA).

If we assume that the scale of housing growth in Option B1 is the South-East Plan figure of 5600 (2006-2026) plus 2 additional years to 2028 (at a rate of 280 per annum), then the total quantum of new homes is 6,160.

If we assume that the 'lower rate' in B2 is indeed the rate set out in the Core Strategy of 3,700-4,100 over the period 2011-2028, then taking in to account the number of completions 2006-2011 of 1,357, the equivalent figure being tested in B1 is 5,457 dwellings (we have taken the higher end of the range, and assume the SA would do this also).

The difference between B1 and B2 is therefore 703 dwellings over the period to 2028, significant in terms of the delivery of new homes and the provision of affordable housing, but much less significant in the context of an existing dwelling stock (as at the 2001 Census) of some 40,100 dwellings overall in Rother District.

Within that context, there are we would suggest four general failings in the analysis of the 'B' options that drive to the credibility of the assessment:

(1) Much of the analysis seems to be predicated on an assumption that additional homes equals additional people which equals additional waste/energy consumption etc. Building new homes does not create additional people on a global level. The people already exist, and therefore so does their energy consumption and waste generation etc;

(2) There is no sense of proportionality in the assessment in terms of the absolute difference between Option B1 and B2. As identified above, in terms of the overall housing stock in Rother, the difference between the options is absolute terms is limited, and when taken together with the fact that the identified effects are often uncertain or of limited significance as well, the SA is unrepresentative as to the magnitude of the effects;

(3) The appraisal is inconsistent in terms of recognising that in most instances it is not actually the number of houses built that would have an impact on the indicators provided, but where and how those houses are built. In some instances (e.g. items 7, 8, and to some extent item 16) the appraisal accepts that quantum of housing is not really the issue, whereas in other cases (e.g. items 10 and 11) the appraisal focuses on quantum without caveating the response in terms of the location/form of housing;

(4) New housing is built to higher environmental standards than existing housing, using less water and energy resources. Although there is an environmental cost in use of energy and materials to produce the house in the first place, the longer term operating cost is much lower than the older housing stock.

We are also concerned with specific inaccuracies in the analysis in items 12, 14 and 15. In each of these cases, the SA alleges specific harm in terms of the number of homes that the higher figure would require to be built in areas at risk of flooding, in areas of biodiversity importance, and in highly sensitive landscape areas such as AONB. In each case, the appraisal states a definitive correlation between the higher Option B1 figure and harm to those interests which is totally unjustified, since previous iterations of the Core Strategy which were premised on the SE Plan did not generate a need for development that compromised these assets.

If entries 12, 14 and 15 are corrected to avoid the inappropriate claim of harm to designated interests, and if the scoring more accurately represented the marginality/lack of certainty of the effects, it would be apparent that Option B1, which provides the homes that are needed in the area, is more sustainable than Option B2.

Option C Comments
Moving on to the 'C' Options, we would comment firstly on discrepancies within the summary of Options C2 (West Bexhill) and C3 (North Bexhill).

Option C1 (North-East Bexhill) is recorded as being in conformity with the South East Plan, which is reasonable, since Policy SCT3 of the South-East Plan specifically refers to mixed-use development sites at North-East Bexhill.

In respect of Option C2, the summary notes no conformity with other plans/policies. However, in respect of Option C3, the summary suggests there is conformity with the South-East Plan, albeit to a lesser extent than C1. This is simply incorrect. North Bexhill is not the same location as North-East Bexhill, and there is no more mention of North Bexhill in the SE Plan than there is of West Bexhill. The summaries on this issue should read the same.

In any event, since the basic approach to housing delivery set out in this Core Strategy is premised on the fact that the South-East Plan will no longer exist at the time of adoption, it is difficult to see what conformity with the South-East Plan is given any weight in the analysis at all.

The summary for Option C2 (West Bexhill) also states that "AA cites habitats issues. Possible conflict with PPS9". The AA does not come to the conclusion that development at West Bexhill would have an adverse impact on biodiversity or habitats. Rather, it says that because of the Pevensey Levels to the west, it cannot rule out the possibility that effects on biodiversity could occur. In this respect, the SA misrepresents the AA, which in fact comes to no conclusion on the matter

Turning to the line by line analysis of C2 and C3, we are concerned by what appears to be an absence of consistency in the treatment of the two locations. Our specific comments include:

Item 1: The suggestion that housing at West Bexhill might be less suited to younger people/local families than housing at North Bexhill is wholly superficial and not borne out by any substantive evidence that we are aware of. In fact, our planning application for West Bexhill is proposing a high proportion of family housing, reflecting the identified needs arising from the SHMA.

Item 2: Generally in the SA analysis if there is any suggestion that North Bexhill may perform better than West Bexhill, then the scoring reflects this. Where, as in the case of item 2, the analysis suggests that West Bexhill performs better than North Bexhill, both options are scored the same.

Item 3: The appraisal of Option B1 in respect of this item notes generally that providing new homes can have a positive impact by reducing deprivation and social exclusion. The analysis of Options C1 and C3 both follow this route and assume that new housing to the North-East of Bexhill and North of Bexhill will have positive effects on reducing crime. Conversely, according to the appraisal at C2, new housing at West Bexhill will have no effect whatsoever on deprivation or social exclusion. There is no evidence whatsoever to support either the positive conclusions in respect of C1 and C3 (building new houses for sale next to deprived areas does not tackle deprivation, if this is indeed the thinking behind the analysis). Providing jobs and affordable housing could have an effect, and West Bexhill can achieve that as well as North Bexhill.

Item 4: Similar failings apply to the analysis in respect of this item. Additionally, the fact that West Bexhill might have an older demographic at the moment is largely a function of the existing housing stock. Providing new family housing will serve to change that, which would seem to be a positive effect.

Item 5: In reality, both West Bexhill and North Bexhill are broadly equidistant to centres of higher education at present. Moreover, access to University and indeed in many cases access to Colleges is not based on proximity to the door, but on selecting the right establishment for the course to be followed, and therefore this is not a micro-geographic issue in the same way that, say, access to a primary school is.

Item 6: It is wholly unclear as to why development at North Bexhill supports economic growth whereas West Bexhill does not.

Item 7: West Bexhill is noted as having "good proximity" to its local centre whereas North Bexhill has "reasonable proximity" to its closest centre. Both enjoy similar levels of accessibility to higher order facilities in Bexhill. However, although West Bexhill is superior in terms of 'doorstep' facilities, both Options are scored the same.

Item 8: Both sites are roughly equi-distant to Bexhill Town Centre. North Bexhill is closer to Ravenside (Leisure Centre, retail park, ten pin bowling), whilst West Bexhill offers better access to the sea front for water sports and leisure, better access to local golf courses, the Little Common Sports Ground, and access to the countryside for quiet enjoyment (none of which is recognised in the SA).

Item 9: Encouraging the prudent use of natural resources would include locating development in areas where walking, cycling, and use of public transport offer serious alternatives to car use. As recognised in item 10, North Bexhill will encourage car usage, due to its peripheral location and dependence on a new Link Road. West Bexhill offers more sustainable travel modes, including walking, cycling access to quality bus services and access to rail services, and should score more highly.

Item 10: See 9 above. It is clear from the analysis that Option C2 for West Bexhill performs better, but the SA does not reflect this.

Item 11: We disagree with the SA that providing new housing with a high environmental performance is likely to increase greenhouse gases. Since CO2 is a significant greenhouse gas, C2 (West Bexhill) performs better since it offers greater opportunities for non-car travel, but the SA does not reflect this.

Item 12: There are no proposals for development at West Bexhill to occur within the floodplain of the Picknell Green Stream, and hence the findings of the SA here are either plain wrong or at best highly misleading. Since Greenfield development is required to meet Greenfield run-off, neither location would increase surface water flooding. In either location, new development can in fact help to redress existing infrastructure issues.

Item 13: Rother District Council will be aware of consultations that we have had with both the EA and NE regarding the implementation of sustainable drainage systems which will ensure that development at West Bexhill will have no effect on either the quantity or quality of water entering the Pevensey Levels. Again, the reporting of the SA is either plain wrong or highly misleading.

Item 14: See item 13 above.

Item 15: The analysis for C2 and C3 records "some landscape impact". We would contend that the sensitivity of the landscape at West Bexhill is less and its ability to accommodate development greater than at North Bexhill.

Item 16: Since the closest civic amenity tip lies on the eastern side of Hastings in the Glyne Gap, both locations are roughly equidistant, and both would involve trips across the town, such that neither has a significant advantage over the other. Provision of on-site recycling facilities would help to reduce the number of movements in both cases.

We accept of course that any SA includes an element of subjective analysis, but in this case, the comparative analysis of Options C2 and C3 is so skewed as to raise serious concerns for the validity of the exercise as a whole.

We are particularly concerned that the SA largely skirts over the 'elephant in the room' in that Option C3 is premised on the development being served by a major new road, cutting through highly sensitive countryside, and linking to a new by-pass (i.e. the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road). Not only will the new access itself be detrimental in terms of its physical impact, but it will be impossible to achieve the more sustainable modes of travel that any major new development should be striving for when the whole focus of the development is ease of access by car.

Although item 10 of the C3 analysis does recognise that North Bexhill will increase car reliance, that recognition does not filter down in to the findings of the analysis on other issues (we have highlighted instances in our assessment above). Rather, the SA is dominated by analysis which seems to take the ease of travel (essentially by car) between destinations A and B as a proxy to sustainable development, when it should not be. The merits of West Bexhill as a location are that it offers genuine opportunities for modal shift (including rail travel, a factor ignored in the assessment), and it provides the ability for many local trips to be made without the need of a vehicle at all.

On any objective analysis, we would suggest that West Bexhill performs more strongly that North Bexhill, but irrespective of that argument, the RDC SA as presented, because of its many failings and inconsistency of application, cannot in any event be afforded any credibility.

Option D Comments
Our comments in respect of Option D reflect in part our comments in respect of Option B, in particular:

(a) That there is no clarity in the SA as to what the practical implications of the two options are, and that there is no clarity as to what option D2 comprises, since it is only described as being "a lower rate of development", without any quantification;

(b) That the SA pre-supposes negative effects arising from the higher level of development in Option D1, without any substantive evidence to support such assertions, whilst the SA at the same time ignores or underplays the benefits arising from new development;

(c) That there remains a substantial inconsistency in the analysis in that on the one hand, it often pre-supposes adverse consequences from new development, and on the other hand, the appraisal frequently also acknowledges both that the effects are hard to assess "without knowing the more specific locations that development would be re-directed to" and that many effects have nothing to so with quantum per se, but the manner in which new development is accommodated.

In short, half of the appraisal appears to be based on comparing other development locations less favourably to North East Bexhill, and the other half states that its is hard to assess the effects when the other development locations are not known.

The Option D appraisal however also introduces inconsistencies between it and the Option B analysis. So for example, under item 2, the B1 analysis accepts that additional housing development can improve health and well-being, but under Option D1 (the equivalent scenario, but looking in particular at Bexhill), a different conclusion is drawn, apparently based on the wholly spurious argument that development elsewhere in Bexhill in advance of North-East Bexhill may have adverse consequences, which is not only unjustified but totally irrelevant to the issue being examined under Option D1.

In the recent Forest Heath judgement, Mr Justice Collins noes that any Sustainability Appraisal should be of the quality required by Article 12(2) of the Directive, noting that:

'Quality involves ensuring that a report is based in proper information and expertise and covers all of the potential effects of the plan or programme in question. In addition, since one of the purposes of the Directive is to allow members of the public to be consulted about plans or programmes which may affect them, the report should enable them to understand why the proposals are said to be environmentally sound.'

A Sustainability Appraisal has been produced, but the lack of consistency and
rigour in the analysis that is displayed, coupled with a lack of clarity as to exactly
what is being tested against what, means that the document fails to achieve the
necessary standard required to meet the requirements of the Directive.

We note from paragraph 4.3.1 that the SA has been carried out internally by
Planning Officers at Rother District Council, "in accordance with advice received
from Baker Associates, whose support was co-ordinated via Planning Advisory
Service". This sentence provides no clarity as to the level of expertise of the
assessors, but it will be apparent from our general and specific comments on the
substance of the SA that we have serious concerns as to the depth and adequacy
of the assessment process.

Perhaps most significantly of all, the lack of clarity in the SA and definition of what
the options actually comprise, and the basis on which they have been tested,
means that the document does not provide any clear rationale or substantive
base upon which the reader can make informed judgements.

For all of the above reasons, the SA is defective and the Core Strategy
procedurally unsound.

That the Council has undertaken a Sustainability Appraisal is not in doubt, since
there is a June 2011 document that bears that label, but we do question, in the
light of the many specific comments raised in this submission, whether or not the
Sustainability Appraisal presented is of the standard necessary to meet the
requirements of Article 12(2) of the Directive, which seeks to ensure that
environmental reports are of a "sufficient quality".

As summarised by Mr Justice Collins in the Forest Heath case:

"Quality involves ensuring that a report is based on proper information and
expertise and covers all of the potential effects of the plan or programme
in question. In addition, since one of the purposes of the Directive is to
allow members of the public to be consulted about plans or programmes
which may affect them, the report should enable them to understand why
the proposals are said to be environmentally sound."

As presented, the Sustainability Appraisal of this Core Strategy falls well short of
the quality required, both in terms of its technical assessment (in particular in
respect of Options B, C and D) and in respect of the presentation of its findings.

We have limited our analysis of the SA to the assessment of Options B, C and D, since they are the issues in which we have greatest interest. The lack of comment on other parts of the SA does not mean that we agree with the findings or the analysis, simply that we have not subjected it to the same level of scrutiny.

Firstly, we are concerned at the lack of clarity in the SA regarding the substance of the options tested. The SA is a self-contained document, and in theory at least the findings of the SA process should inform the substance of the Core Strategy, notwithstanding that the production of the two documents may occur in tandem. It is essential therefore that a reader of the SA has a clear understanding of what is being assessed, and on what basis the assessment has taken place.

In many instances, the definition of the options presented in the SA is vague or obscure. So for example in respect of issue B and the overall scale of growth, it is firstly apparent that "growth" in this context only means "housing numbers", and secondly that the description of the two different variants is not consistent. Option B1 relates to a specific and quantifiable level of housing development over a set period (5,600 between 2006-2026), whilst Option B2 refers to a much vaguer alternative of "a lower rate of development ... in recognition of changed circumstances."

There is no clarity in the SA itself as to what the 'lower rate of development' or the changed circumstances are. Although it may well be that the 'lower rate' assessed is the rate of development proposed in the Core Strategy, there is no clarity in the SA of what has been assessed against what.

Similarly, in respect of Option C, the SA provides three alternatives that speak of a "focus" of new development at different locations, but the SA does not define what this means in practice. Are the quantums of development envisaged under the variants the same, or does a "focus" at North Bexhill mean something different to a "focus" at North-East Bexhill? Does "focus" mean all non-committed development is ascribed to those locations for just a proportion, and if the latter, what proportion?

In respect of Option D, we are unclear as to why no reference is made to Option D in the summary on pages 47-50, which means the only information relating to this option is buried in the SA on pages 136 and 137. Again, there is a contrast between the description of the rejected option D1, which refers to continuing the scale and rate of development set out in the previous iteration of the Core Strategy (which although not quoted in the SA, is a quantifiable figure), and the preferred Option D2 which assesses an unspecified "lower rate of development".

It may well be that a diligent reader can deduce from reading the current Core Strategy and previous iterations of the Core Strategy what the difference between Options D1 and D2 might be, but taken at face value, the SA document provides the reader with no information as to the alternatives being assessed or the real difference between them, and therefore it fails in its duty to present the environmental analysis in a manner which is easy to understand, and moreover in a manner which is clear and unambiguous.

Turning then secondly to the substance of the analysis of the options presented in the relevant tables (pages 131-132 for the 'B' options, 133-135 for the 'C' options, and 136-137 for the 'D' options), we are concerned that the quality of the analysis presented falls well short of the standard for such a document. The following specific points illustrate our concerns.

Option B comments

The difference between Option B1 and B2 is that option B1 provides more dwellings that Option B2 (although as per the above, the actual difference is not clear from the SA).

If we assume that the scale of housing growth in Option B1 is the South-East Plan figure of 5600 (2006-2026) plus 2 additional years to 2028 (at a rate of 280 per annum), then the total quantum of new homes is 6,160.

If we assume that the 'lower rate' in B2 is indeed the rate set out in the Core Strategy of 3,700-4,100 over the period 2011-2028, then taking in to account the number of completions 2006-2011 of 1,357, the equivalent figure being tested in B1 is 5,457 dwellings (we have taken the higher end of the range, and assume the SA would do this also).

The difference between B1 and B2 is therefore 703 dwellings over the period to 2028, significant in terms of the delivery of new homes and the provision of affordable housing, but much less significant in the context of an existing dwelling stock (as at the 2001 Census) of some 40,100 dwellings overall in Rother District.

Within that context, there are we would suggest four general failings in the analysis of the 'B' options that drive to the credibility of the assessment:

(1) Much of the analysis seems to be predicated on an assumption that additional homes equals additional people which equals additional waste/energy consumption etc. Building new homes does not create additional people on a global level. The people already exist, and therefore so does their energy consumption and waste generation etc;

(2) There is no sense of proportionality in the assessment in terms of the absolute difference between Option B1 and B2. As identified above, in terms of the overall housing stock in Rother, the difference between the options is absolute terms is limited, and when taken together with the fact that the identified effects are often uncertain or of limited significance as well, the SA is unrepresentative as to the magnitude of the effects;

(3) The appraisal is inconsistent in terms of recognising that in most instances it is not actually the number of houses built that would have an impact on the indicators provided, but where and how those houses are built. In some instances (e.g. items 7, 8, and to some extent item 16) the appraisal accepts that quantum of housing is not really the issue, whereas in other cases (e.g. items 10 and 11) the appraisal focuses on quantum without caveating the response in terms of the location/form of housing;

(4) New housing is built to higher environmental standards than existing housing, using less water and energy resources. Although there is an environmental cost in use of energy and materials to produce the house in the first place, the longer term operating cost is much lower than the older housing stock.

We are also concerned with specific inaccuracies in the analysis in items 12, 14 and 15. In each of these cases, the SA alleges specific harm in terms of the number of homes that the higher figure would require to be built in areas at risk of flooding, in areas of biodiversity importance, and in highly sensitive landscape areas such as AONB. In each case, the appraisal states a definitive correlation between the higher Option B1 figure and harm to those interests which is totally unjustified, since previous iterations of the Core Strategy which were premised on the SE Plan did not generate a need for development that compromised these assets.

If entries 12, 14 and 15 are corrected to avoid the inappropriate claim of harm to designated interests, and if the scoring more accurately represented the marginality/lack of certainty of the effects, it would be apparent that Option B1, which provides the homes that are needed in the area, is more sustainable than Option B2.

Option C Comments
Moving on to the 'C' Options, we would comment firstly on discrepancies within the summary of Options C2 (West Bexhill) and C3 (North Bexhill).

Option C1 (North-East Bexhill) is recorded as being in conformity with the South East Plan, which is reasonable, since Policy SCT3 of the South-East Plan specifically refers to mixed-use development sites at North-East Bexhill.

In respect of Option C2, the summary notes no conformity with other plans/policies. However, in respect of Option C3, the summary suggests there is conformity with the South-East Plan, albeit to a lesser extent than C1. This is simply incorrect. North Bexhill is not the same location as North-East Bexhill, and there is no more mention of North Bexhill in the SE Plan than there is of West Bexhill. The summaries on this issue should read the same.

In any event, since the basic approach to housing delivery set out in this Core Strategy is premised on the fact that the South-East Plan will no longer exist at the time of adoption, it is difficult to see what conformity with the South-East Plan is given any weight in the analysis at all.

The summary for Option C2 (West Bexhill) also states that "AA cites habitats issues. Possible conflict with PPS9". The AA does not come to the conclusion that development at West Bexhill would have an adverse impact on biodiversity or habitats. Rather, it says that because of the Pevensey Levels to the west, it cannot rule out the possibility that effects on biodiversity could occur. In this respect, the SA misrepresents the AA, which in fact comes to no conclusion on the matter

Turning to the line by line analysis of C2 and C3, we are concerned by what appears to be an absence of consistency in the treatment of the two locations. Our specific comments include:

Item 1: The suggestion that housing at West Bexhill might be less suited to younger people/local families than housing at North Bexhill is wholly superficial and not borne out by any substantive evidence that we are aware of. In fact, our planning application for West Bexhill is proposing a high proportion of family housing, reflecting the identified needs arising from the SHMA.

Item 2: Generally in the SA analysis if there is any suggestion that North Bexhill may perform better than West Bexhill, then the scoring reflects this. Where, as in the case of item 2, the analysis suggests that West Bexhill performs better than North Bexhill, both options are scored the same.

Item 3: The appraisal of Option B1 in respect of this item notes generally that providing new homes can have a positive impact by reducing deprivation and social exclusion. The analysis of Options C1 and C3 both follow this route and assume that new housing to the North-East of Bexhill and North of Bexhill will have positive effects on reducing crime. Conversely, according to the appraisal at C2, new housing at West Bexhill will have no effect whatsoever on deprivation or social exclusion. There is no evidence whatsoever to support either the positive conclusions in respect of C1 and C3 (building new houses for sale next to deprived areas does not tackle deprivation, if this is indeed the thinking behind the analysis). Providing jobs and affordable housing could have an effect, and West Bexhill can achieve that as well as North Bexhill.

Item 4: Similar failings apply to the analysis in respect of this item. Additionally, the fact that West Bexhill might have an older demographic at the moment is largely a function of the existing housing stock. Providing new family housing will serve to change that, which would seem to be a positive effect.

Item 5: In reality, both West Bexhill and North Bexhill are broadly equidistant to centres of higher education at present. Moreover, access to University and indeed in many cases access to Colleges is not based on proximity to the door, but on selecting the right establishment for the course to be followed, and therefore this is not a micro-geographic issue in the same way that, say, access to a primary school is.

Item 6: It is wholly unclear as to why development at North Bexhill supports economic growth whereas West Bexhill does not.

Item 7: West Bexhill is noted as having "good proximity" to its local centre whereas North Bexhill has "reasonable proximity" to its closest centre. Both enjoy similar levels of accessibility to higher order facilities in Bexhill. However, although West Bexhill is superior in terms of 'doorstep' facilities, both Options are scored the same.

Item 8: Both sites are roughly equi-distant to Bexhill Town Centre. North Bexhill is closer to Ravenside (Leisure Centre, retail park, ten pin bowling), whilst West Bexhill offers better access to the sea front for water sports and leisure, better access to local golf courses, the Little Common Sports Ground, and access to the countryside for quiet enjoyment (none of which is recognised in the SA).

Item 9: Encouraging the prudent use of natural resources would include locating development in areas where walking, cycling, and use of public transport offer serious alternatives to car use. As recognised in item 10, North Bexhill will encourage car usage, due to its peripheral location and dependence on a new Link Road. West Bexhill offers more sustainable travel modes, including walking, cycling access to quality bus services and access to rail services, and should score more highly.

Item 10: See 9 above. It is clear from the analysis that Option C2 for West Bexhill performs better, but the SA does not reflect this.

Item 11: We disagree with the SA that providing new housing with a high environmental performance is likely to increase greenhouse gases. Since CO2 is a significant greenhouse gas, C2 (West Bexhill) performs better since it offers greater opportunities for non-car travel, but the SA does not reflect this.

Item 12: There are no proposals for development at West Bexhill to occur within the floodplain of the Picknell Green Stream, and hence the findings of the SA here are either plain wrong or at best highly misleading. Since Greenfield development is required to meet Greenfield run-off, neither location would increase surface water flooding. In either location, new development can in fact help to redress existing infrastructure issues.

Item 13: Rother District Council will be aware of consultations that we have had with both the EA and NE regarding the implementation of sustainable drainage systems which will ensure that development at West Bexhill will have no effect on either the quantity or quality of water entering the Pevensey Levels. Again, the reporting of the SA is either plain wrong or highly misleading.

Item 14: See item 13 above.

Item 15: The analysis for C2 and C3 records "some landscape impact". We would contend that the sensitivity of the landscape at West Bexhill is less and its ability to accommodate development greater than at North Bexhill.

Item 16: Since the closest civic amenity tip lies on the eastern side of Hastings in the Glyne Gap, both locations are roughly equidistant, and both would involve trips across the town, such that neither has a significant advantage over the other. Provision of on-site recycling facilities would help to reduce the number of movements in both cases.

We accept of course that any SA includes an element of subjective analysis, but in this case, the comparative analysis of Options C2 and C3 is so skewed as to raise serious concerns for the validity of the exercise as a whole.

We are particularly concerned that the SA largely skirts over the 'elephant in the room' in that Option C3 is premised on the development being served by a major new road, cutting through highly sensitive countryside, and linking to a new by-pass (i.e. the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road). Not only will the new access itself be detrimental in terms of its physical impact, but it will be impossible to achieve the more sustainable modes of travel that any major new development should be striving for when the whole focus of the development is ease of access by car.

Although item 10 of the C3 analysis does recognise that North Bexhill will increase car reliance, that recognition does not filter down in to the findings of the analysis on other issues (we have highlighted instances in our assessment above). Rather, the SA is dominated by analysis which seems to take the ease of travel (essentially by car) between destinations A and B as a proxy to sustainable development, when it should not be. The merits of West Bexhill as a location are that it offers genuine opportunities for modal shift (including rail travel, a factor ignored in the assessment), and it provides the ability for many local trips to be made without the need of a vehicle at all.

On any objective analysis, we would suggest that West Bexhill performs more strongly that North Bexhill, but irrespective of that argument, the RDC SA as presented, because of its many failings and inconsistency of application, cannot in any event be afforded any credibility.

Option D Comments
Our comments in respect of Option D reflect in part our comments in respect of Option B, in particular:

(a) That there is no clarity in the SA as to what the practical implications of the two options are, and that there is no clarity as to what option D2 comprises, since it is only described as being "a lower rate of development", without any quantification;

(b) That the SA pre-supposes negative effects arising from the higher level of development in Option D1, without any substantive evidence to support such assertions, whilst the SA at the same time ignores or underplays the benefits arising from new development;

(c) That there remains a substantial inconsistency in the analysis in that on the one hand, it often pre-supposes adverse consequences from new development, and on the other hand, the appraisal frequently also acknowledges both that the effects are hard to assess "without knowing the more specific locations that development would be re-directed to" and that many effects have nothing to so with quantum per se, but the manner in which new development is accommodated.

In short, half of the appraisal appears to be based on comparing other development locations less favourably to North East Bexhill, and the other half states that its is hard to assess the effects when the other development locations are not known.

The Option D appraisal however also introduces inconsistencies between it and the Option B analysis. So for example, under item 2, the B1 analysis accepts that additional housing development can improve health and well-being, but under Option D1 (the equivalent scenario, but looking in particular at Bexhill), a different conclusion is drawn, apparently based on the wholly spurious argument that development elsewhere in Bexhill in advance of North-East Bexhill may have adverse consequences, which is not only unjustified but totally irrelevant to the issue being examined under Option D1.

In the recent Forest Heath judgement, Mr Justice Collins noes that any Sustainability Appraisal should be of the quality required by Article 12(2) of the Directive, noting that:

'Quality involves ensuring that a report is based in proper information and expertise and covers all of the potential effects of the plan or programme in question. In addition, since one of the purposes of the Directive is to allow members of the public to be consulted about plans or programmes which may affect them, the report should enable them to understand why the proposals are said to be environmentally sound.'

A Sustainability Appraisal has been produced, but the lack of consistency and
rigour in the analysis that is displayed, coupled with a lack of clarity as to exactly
what is being tested against what, means that the document fails to achieve the
necessary standard required to meet the requirements of the Directive.

We note from paragraph 4.3.1 that the SA has been carried out internally by
Planning Officers at Rother District Council, "in accordance with advice received
from Baker Associates, whose support was co-ordinated via Planning Advisory
Service". This sentence provides no clarity as to the level of expertise of the
assessors, but it will be apparent from our general and specific comments on the
substance of the SA that we have serious concerns as to the depth and adequacy
of the assessment process.

Perhaps most significantly of all, the lack of clarity in the SA and definition of what
the options actually comprise, and the basis on which they have been tested,
means that the document does not provide any clear rationale or substantive
base upon which the reader can make informed judgements.

For all of the above reasons, the SA is defective and the Core Strategy
procedurally unsound.

That the Council has undertaken a Sustainability Appraisal is not in doubt, since
there is a June 2011 document that bears that label, but we do question, in the
light of the many specific comments raised in this submission, whether or not the
Sustainability Appraisal presented is of the standard necessary to meet the
requirements of Article 12(2) of the Directive, which seeks to ensure that
environmental reports are of a "sufficient quality".

As summarised by Mr Justice Collins in the Forest Heath case:

"Quality involves ensuring that a report is based on proper information and
expertise and covers all of the potential effects of the plan or programme
in question. In addition, since one of the purposes of the Directive is to
allow members of the public to be consulted about plans or programmes
which may affect them, the report should enable them to understand why
the proposals are said to be environmentally sound."

As presented, the Sustainability Appraisal of this Core Strategy falls well short of
the quality required, both in terms of its technical assessment (in particular in
respect of Options B, C and D) and in respect of the presentation of its findings.

We have limited our analysis of the SA to the assessment of Options B, C and D, since they are the issues in which we have greatest interest. The lack of comment on other parts of the SA does not mean that we agree with the findings or the analysis, simply that we have not subjected it to the same level of scrutiny.

Firstly, we are concerned at the lack of clarity in the SA regarding the substance of the options tested. The SA is a self-contained document, and in theory at least the findings of the SA process should inform the substance of the Core Strategy, notwithstanding that the production of the two documents may occur in tandem. It is essential therefore that a reader of the SA has a clear understanding of what is being assessed, and on what basis the assessment has taken place.

In many instances, the definition of the options presented in the SA is vague or obscure. So for example in respect of issue B and the overall scale of growth, it is firstly apparent that "growth" in this context only means "housing numbers", and secondly that the description of the two different variants is not consistent. Option B1 relates to a specific and quantifiable level of housing development over a set period (5,600 between 2006-2026), whilst Option B2 refers to a much vaguer alternative of "a lower rate of development ... in recognition of changed circumstances."

There is no clarity in the SA itself as to what the 'lower rate of development' or the changed circumstances are. Although it may well be that the 'lower rate' assessed is the rate of development proposed in the Core Strategy, there is no clarity in the SA of what has been assessed against what.

Similarly, in respect of Option C, the SA provides three alternatives that speak of a "focus" of new development at different locations, but the SA does not define what this means in practice. Are the quantums of development envisaged under the variants the same, or does a "focus" at North Bexhill mean something different to a "focus" at North-East Bexhill? Does "focus" mean all non-committed development is ascribed to those locations for just a proportion, and if the latter, what proportion?

In respect of Option D, we are unclear as to why no reference is made to Option D in the summary on pages 47-50, which means the only information relating to this option is buried in the SA on pages 136 and 137. Again, there is a contrast between the description of the rejected option D1, which refers to continuing the scale and rate of development set out in the previous iteration of the Core Strategy (which although not quoted in the SA, is a quantifiable figure), and the preferred Option D2 which assesses an unspecified "lower rate of development".

It may well be that a diligent reader can deduce from reading the current Core Strategy and previous iterations of the Core Strategy what the difference between Options D1 and D2 might be, but taken at face value, the SA document provides the reader with no information as to the alternatives being assessed or the real difference between them, and therefore it fails in its duty to present the environmental analysis in a manner which is easy to understand, and moreover in a manner which is clear and unambiguous.

Turning then secondly to the substance of the analysis of the options presented in the relevant tables (pages 131-132 for the 'B' options, 133-135 for the 'C' options, and 136-137 for the 'D' options), we are concerned that the quality of the analysis presented falls well short of the standard for such a document. The following specific points illustrate our concerns.

Option B comments

The difference between Option B1 and B2 is that option B1 provides more dwellings that Option B2 (although as per the above, the actual difference is not clear from the SA).

If we assume that the scale of housing growth in Option B1 is the South-East Plan figure of 5600 (2006-2026) plus 2 additional years to 2028 (at a rate of 280 per annum), then the total quantum of new homes is 6,160.

If we assume that the 'lower rate' in B2 is indeed the rate set out in the Core Strategy of 3,700-4,100 over the period 2011-2028, then taking in to account the number of completions 2006-2011 of 1,357, the equivalent figure being tested in B1 is 5,457 dwellings (we have taken the higher end of the range, and assume the SA would do this also).

The difference between B1 and B2 is therefore 703 dwellings over the period to 2028, significant in terms of the delivery of new homes and the provision of affordable housing, but much less significant in the context of an existing dwelling stock (as at the 2001 Census) of some 40,100 dwellings overall in Rother District.

Within that context, there are we would suggest four general failings in the analysis of the 'B' options that drive to the credibility of the assessment:

(1) Much of the analysis seems to be predicated on an assumption that additional homes equals additional people which equals additional waste/energy consumption etc. Building new homes does not create additional people on a global level. The people already exist, and therefore so does their energy consumption and waste generation etc;

(2) There is no sense of proportionality in the assessment in terms of the absolute difference between Option B1 and B2. As identified above, in terms of the overall housing stock in Rother, the difference between the options is absolute terms is limited, and when taken together with the fact that the identified effects are often uncertain or of limited significance as well, the SA is unrepresentative as to the magnitude of the effects;

(3) The appraisal is inconsistent in terms of recognising that in most instances it is not actually the number of houses built that would have an impact on the indicators provided, but where and how those houses are built. In some instances (e.g. items 7, 8, and to some extent item 16) the appraisal accepts that quantum of housing is not really the issue, whereas in other cases (e.g. items 10 and 11) the appraisal focuses on quantum without caveating the response in terms of the location/form of housing;

(4) New housing is built to higher environmental standards than existing housing, using less water and energy resources. Although there is an environmental cost in use of energy and materials to produce the house in the first place, the longer term operating cost is much lower than the older housing stock.

We are also concerned with specific inaccuracies in the analysis in items 12, 14 and 15. In each of these cases, the SA alleges specific harm in terms of the number of homes that the higher figure would require to be built in areas at risk of flooding, in areas of biodiversity importance, and in highly sensitive landscape areas such as AONB. In each case, the appraisal states a definitive correlation between the higher Option B1 figure and harm to those interests which is totally unjustified, since previous iterations of the Core Strategy which were premised on the SE Plan did not generate a need for development that compromised these assets.

If entries 12, 14 and 15 are corrected to avoid the inappropriate claim of harm to designated interests, and if the scoring more accurately represented the marginality/lack of certainty of the effects, it would be apparent that Option B1, which provides the homes that are needed in the area, is more sustainable than Option B2.

Option C Comments
Moving on to the 'C' Options, we would comment firstly on discrepancies within the summary of Options C2 (West Bexhill) and C3 (North Bexhill).

Option C1 (North-East Bexhill) is recorded as being in conformity with the South East Plan, which is reasonable, since Policy SCT3 of the South-East Plan specifically refers to mixed-use development sites at North-East Bexhill.

In respect of Option C2, the summary notes no conformity with other plans/policies. However, in respect of Option C3, the summary suggests there is conformity with the South-East Plan, albeit to a lesser extent than C1. This is simply incorrect. North Bexhill is not the same location as North-East Bexhill, and there is no more mention of North Bexhill in the SE Plan than there is of West Bexhill. The summaries on this issue should read the same.

In any event, since the basic approach to housing delivery set out in this Core Strategy is premised on the fact that the South-East Plan will no longer exist at the time of adoption, it is difficult to see what conformity with the South-East Plan is given any weight in the analysis at all.

The summary for Option C2 (West Bexhill) also states that "AA cites habitats issues. Possible conflict with PPS9". The AA does not come to the conclusion that development at West Bexhill would have an adverse impact on biodiversity or habitats. Rather, it says that because of the Pevensey Levels to the west, it cannot rule out the possibility that effects on biodiversity could occur. In this respect, the SA misrepresents the AA, which in fact comes to no conclusion on the matter

Turning to the line by line analysis of C2 and C3, we are concerned by what appears to be an absence of consistency in the treatment of the two locations. Our specific comments include:

Item 1: The suggestion that housing at West Bexhill might be less suited to younger people/local families than housing at North Bexhill is wholly superficial and not borne out by any substantive evidence that we are aware of. In fact, our planning application for West Bexhill is proposing a high proportion of family housing, reflecting the identified needs arising from the SHMA.

Item 2: Generally in the SA analysis if there is any suggestion that North Bexhill may perform better than West Bexhill, then the scoring reflects this. Where, as in the case of item 2, the analysis suggests that West Bexhill performs better than North Bexhill, both options are scored the same.

Item 3: The appraisal of Option B1 in respect of this item notes generally that providing new homes can have a positive impact by reducing deprivation and social exclusion. The analysis of Options C1 and C3 both follow this route and assume that new housing to the North-East of Bexhill and North of Bexhill will have positive effects on reducing crime. Conversely, according to the appraisal at C2, new housing at West Bexhill will have no effect whatsoever on deprivation or social exclusion. There is no evidence whatsoever to support either the positive conclusions in respect of C1 and C3 (building new houses for sale next to deprived areas does not tackle deprivation, if this is indeed the thinking behind the analysis). Providing jobs and affordable housing could have an effect, and West Bexhill can achieve that as well as North Bexhill.

Item 4: Similar failings apply to the analysis in respect of this item. Additionally, the fact that West Bexhill might have an older demographic at the moment is largely a function of the existing housing stock. Providing new family housing will serve to change that, which would seem to be a positive effect.

Item 5: In reality, both West Bexhill and North Bexhill are broadly equidistant to centres of higher education at present. Moreover, access to University and indeed in many cases access to Colleges is not based on proximity to the door, but on selecting the right establishment for the course to be followed, and therefore this is not a micro-geographic issue in the same way that, say, access to a primary school is.

Item 6: It is wholly unclear as to why development at North Bexhill supports economic growth whereas West Bexhill does not.

Item 7: West Bexhill is noted as having "good proximity" to its local centre whereas North Bexhill has "reasonable proximity" to its closest centre. Both enjoy similar levels of accessibility to higher order facilities in Bexhill. However, although West Bexhill is superior in terms of 'doorstep' facilities, both Options are scored the same.

Item 8: Both sites are roughly equi-distant to Bexhill Town Centre. North Bexhill is closer to Ravenside (Leisure Centre, retail park, ten pin bowling), whilst West Bexhill offers better access to the sea front for water sports and leisure, better access to local golf courses, the Little Common Sports Ground, and access to the countryside for quiet enjoyment (none of which is recognised in the SA).

Item 9: Encouraging the prudent use of natural resources would include locating development in areas where walking, cycling, and use of public transport offer serious alternatives to car use. As recognised in item 10, North Bexhill will encourage car usage, due to its peripheral location and dependence on a new Link Road. West Bexhill offers more sustainable travel modes, including walking, cycling access to quality bus services and access to rail services, and should score more highly.

Item 10: See 9 above. It is clear from the analysis that Option C2 for West Bexhill performs better, but the SA does not reflect this.

Item 11: We disagree with the SA that providing new housing with a high environmental performance is likely to increase greenhouse gases. Since CO2 is a significant greenhouse gas, C2 (West Bexhill) performs better since it offers greater opportunities for non-car travel, but the SA does not reflect this.

Item 12: There are no proposals for development at West Bexhill to occur within the floodplain of the Picknell Green Stream, and hence the findings of the SA here are either plain wrong or at best highly misleading. Since Greenfield development is required to meet Greenfield run-off, neither location would increase surface water flooding. In either location, new development can in fact help to redress existing infrastructure issues.

Item 13: Rother District Council will be aware of consultations that we have had with both the EA and NE regarding the implementation of sustainable drainage systems which will ensure that development at West Bexhill will have no effect on either the quantity or quality of water entering the Pevensey Levels. Again, the reporting of the SA is either plain wrong or highly misleading.

Item 14: See item 13 above.

Item 15: The analysis for C2 and C3 records "some landscape impact". We would contend that the sensitivity of the landscape at West Bexhill is less and its ability to accommodate development greater than at North Bexhill.

Item 16: Since the closest civic amenity tip lies on the eastern side of Hastings in the Glyne Gap, both locations are roughly equidistant, and both would involve trips across the town, such that neither has a significant advantage over the other. Provision of on-site recycling facilities would help to reduce the number of movements in both cases.

We accept of course that any SA includes an element of subjective analysis, but in this case, the comparative analysis of Options C2 and C3 is so skewed as to raise serious concerns for the validity of the exercise as a whole.

We are particularly concerned that the SA largely skirts over the 'elephant in the room' in that Option C3 is premised on the development being served by a major new road, cutting through highly sensitive countryside, and linking to a new by-pass (i.e. the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road). Not only will the new access itself be detrimental in terms of its physical impact, but it will be impossible to achieve the more sustainable modes of travel that any major new development should be striving for when the whole focus of the development is ease of access by car.

Although item 10 of the C3 analysis does recognise that North Bexhill will increase car reliance, that recognition does not filter down in to the findings of the analysis on other issues (we have highlighted instances in our assessment above). Rather, the SA is dominated by analysis which seems to take the ease of travel (essentially by car) between destinations A and B as a proxy to sustainable development, when it should not be. The merits of West Bexhill as a location are that it offers genuine opportunities for modal shift (including rail travel, a factor ignored in the assessment), and it provides the ability for many local trips to be made without the need of a vehicle at all.

On any objective analysis, we would suggest that West Bexhill performs more strongly that North Bexhill, but irrespective of that argument, the RDC SA as presented, because of its many failings and inconsistency of application, cannot in any event be afforded any credibility.

Option D Comments
Our comments in respect of Option D reflect in part our comments in respect of Option B, in particular:

(a) That there is no clarity in the SA as to what the practical implications of the two options are, and that there is no clarity as to what option D2 comprises, since it is only described as being "a lower rate of development", without any quantification;

(b) That the SA pre-supposes negative effects arising from the higher level of development in Option D1, without any substantive evidence to support such assertions, whilst the SA at the same time ignores or underplays the benefits arising from new development;

(c) That there remains a substantial inconsistency in the analysis in that on the one hand, it often pre-supposes adverse consequences from new development, and on the other hand, the appraisal frequently also acknowledges both that the effects are hard to assess "without knowing the more specific locations that development would be re-directed to" and that many effects have nothing to so with quantum per se, but the manner in which new development is accommodated.

In short, half of the appraisal appears to be based on comparing other development locations less favourably to North East Bexhill, and the other half states that its is hard to assess the effects when the other development locations are not known.

The Option D appraisal however also introduces inconsistencies between it and the Option B analysis. So for example, under item 2, the B1 analysis accepts that additional housing development can improve health and well-being, but under Option D1 (the equivalent scenario, but looking in particular at Bexhill), a different conclusion is drawn, apparently based on the wholly spurious argument that development elsewhere in Bexhill in advance of North-East Bexhill may have adverse consequences, which is not only unjustified but totally irrelevant to the issue being examined under Option D1.

In the recent Forest Heath judgement, Mr Justice Collins noes that any Sustainability Appraisal should be of the quality required by Article 12(2) of the Directive, noting that:

'Quality involves ensuring that a report is based in proper information and expertise and covers all of the potential effects of the plan or programme in question. In addition, since one of the purposes of the Directive is to allow members of the public to be consulted about plans or programmes which may affect them, the report should enable them to understand why the proposals are said to be environmentally sound.'

A Sustainability Appraisal has been produced, but the lack of consistency and
rigour in the analysis that is displayed, coupled with a lack of clarity as to exactly
what is being tested against what, means that the document fails to achieve the
necessary standard required to meet the requirements of the Directive.

We note from paragraph 4.3.1 that the SA has been carried out internally by
Planning Officers at Rother District Council, "in accordance with advice received
from Baker Associates, whose support was co-ordinated via Planning Advisory
Service". This sentence provides no clarity as to the level of expertise of the
assessors, but it will be apparent from our general and specific comments on the
substance of the SA that we have serious concerns as to the depth and adequacy
of the assessment process.

Perhaps most significantly of all, the lack of clarity in the SA and definition of what
the options actually comprise, and the basis on which they have been tested,
means that the document does not provide any clear rationale or substantive
base upon which the reader can make informed judgements.

For all of the above reasons, the SA is defective and the Core Strategy
procedurally unsound.

Summary

1. The Council's strategy for Bexhill as set out in Policy BX3 and Policy OSS2 in
respect of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road are intertwined in the Core Strategy.
These submissions therefore consider both issues together.

2. Our objections to OSS2 are as follows:

(1) That in principle policy OSS2 is an inappropriate policy to include in the
Core Strategy, because it effectively provides for two very different Core
Strategies to be followed, depending upon the eventual decision of the
Bexhill-Hastings Link Road;

(2) That parts (ii) and (iii) of OSS2 in respect of the alternative Core Strategy
that arises in the absence of the Link Road have not been subject to
Sustainability Appraisal;

(3) That Part (iii) of the Policy in any event provides an inappropriate and
essentially unworkable contingency scenario for the Bexhill area which is
not Justified, and nor will it be Effective in delivering the housing strategy
that the area needs. Strategic growth at West Bexhill is not dependent
upon the provision of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road.
3. Our objections to BX3 are as follows:

(1) That the overall scale of housing growth for Bexhill should be increased in
line with our objections to OSS1 in respect of the District -wide housing
strategy (criteria ii of BX3);

(2) That the timing of construction of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road should
not dictate the precise number of houses to be provided, in accordance
with our related submissions regarding OSS2 (criteria ii of BX3);

(3) That the policy (and strategy generally) places over-reliance upon the
availability of development opportunities within the existing urban area of
Bexhill which are unlikely to be delivered (criteria iii of BX3);

(4) That the policy should not be referring to an inappropriate and
undeliverable growth location at North Bexhill (criteria iii of BX3);

(5) That the scale, timing and location of development west of Bexhill should
be established as part of this Core Strategy as a strategic allocation, and
not through a subsequent Site Allocation (criteria iii of BX3).

At the outset, it would be appropriate to make clear that the premise in the Core Strategy that all strategic scale development in Bexhill is dependent upon the delivery of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road is simply not accepted, and nor does the Council's evidence base contain any information to support its position.

It is this unsubstantiated premise that underlines the substance of Part (iii) of Policy OSS2, which basically says that in the absence of the Link Road no strategic sites can come forward at Bexhill, and it is this unsubstantiated premise that underpins the phasing provisions at paragraph 8.54 and criteria (ii) of Policy BX3.

At earlier stages of the Core Strategy process, we have submitted provisional transportation strategy work that shows the potential of a strategic site at West Bexhill to be delivered irrespective of the construction of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road. As part of the preparation of a planning application for West Bexhill, our clients' Transport Consultants, Peter Brett Associates, are updating their highway impact assessments based upon the trip assignments being used by East Sussex County Council in their own modelling work for the Link Road. Even using the County Council's own baseline information, the assessment work for West Bexhill is continuing to show that a strategic development of some 450 new homes (and commercial uses) can be accommodated without detriment to the local highway network, and, significantly, that flows on the network on the eastern side of Bexhill are not materially affected by the construction of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road.

The findings (based on zero modal shift, and therefore representing worst-case scenarios) show both that the impact of the development in terms of east-bound trips towards Hastings is minimal, and the lack of significant difference between the 'with the Link Road' and 'without the Link Road' scenarios.

This work is still being refined, but will be presented to the Council as part of the forthcoming West Bexhill planning application, and through that mechanism the evidence will be available to inform debate at the Core Strategy Examination. We would also wish to reserve the right to submit representations on the Council's transportation evidence base, which we understand is not finished and has not been made available alongside the Pre-Submission consultation.

Within that context, we turn to consider firstly Policy OSS2, followed by paragraph 8.54 and then Policy BX3.

Policy OSS2
Policy OSS1 sets out a clear spatial development strategy which establishes that by 2028, provision will be made for up to 4,100 new homes and 100,000 sq m of new business floorspace. Although we object to the number of new homes, as per our representations to OSS1, the policy itself (coupled with the distribution of development in Figure 8) is relatively clear and unambiguous as to what the Core Strategy is going to achieve.

Policy OSS2, however, states that if the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road is delayed, or otherwise does not come forward as expected, then a completely different Core Strategy might be pursued, but no details are given as to what that different Core Strategy might actually contain, nor what its practical implications might be.

Even leaving aside the very unhelpful lack of clarity that OSS2 creates, the inclusion of OSS2 raises two fundamental concerns:

(a) Firstly, that it is inappropriate to have a policy in a Plan, the implementation of which, would critically undermine other aspects of the Plan and the Spatial Vision; and

(b) That it is not possible to undertake any sort of credible Sustainability Assessment of the effects of Policy OSS2, because the Policy does not actually set out what the effects of its implementation would be.

In relation to the first point, we understand that Core Strategies are supposed to contain an element of flexibility to cater for changing circumstances, but the inclusion of OSS2 is essentially to put forward two completely different Core Strategies. If the Link Road is built to the timetable currently envisaged, then the Core Strategy will proceed in accordance with OSS1. If the Link Road is not built at all, or is significantly delayed, then the strategy set out in OSS1 will not be pursued, but the policy does not explain clearly what alternative Core Strategy is to be pursued, largely because decisions as to the scale and location of growth are then to be delegated to a separate highway modelling exercise to be undertaken in conjunction with the County Council and Hastings (criterion d of part iii of OSS2) .

Whilst there is no certainty as to what this second 'fallback' Core Strategy might be, the wording of the policy makes clear that the development strategy would be very different to OSS1, and therefore in effect, this Core Strategy contains two development strategies, one set out in OSS1, and one as yet to be disclosed that could arise as a result of OSS2.

This leads on to the second concern above, that in the absence of any confirmation as to what the alternative strategy would be, it is impossible to submit OSS2 to any form of sensible Sustainability Appraisal.

It is evident when reading the published Sustainability Appraisal that the SA has simply ignored the consequences of parts (ii) and (iii) of the Policy, and all of the analysis relates solely to the impact of the Link Road itself. Thus, for example, on page 143 of the SA, in response to Objective 1 (opportunity to live in a decent home), the assessment for OSS1 records a positive result, and on page 144, the assessment for OSS2 records the same positive result, on the basis that the Link Road is associated with delivering new housing. However, the converse position presented by OSS2, that without the Link Road housing provision at Bexhill will be substantially reduced, is not assessed.

Similar discrepancies occur throughout the assessment process, with OSS2 only being considered against the first part of the policy which presumes the Link Road comes forward, not the remainder of the Policy which presumes that it does not.

Of course, by the time that this Core Strategy comes to be examined, a decision on whether or not the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road is to receive funding, and a broad timetable for delivery, will be known. Depending upon the outcome of that decision, Policy OSS2 (or potentially Policy OSS1) is likely to become redundant anyway.

For the above reasons, we consider that the inclusion of OSS2 is inappropriate, and the policy should be deleted.

If, notwithstanding the above, Policy OSS2 were to be retained in the Plan, then we have concerns as to whether or not the methodology set out in criterion (iii) actually provides a workable contingency scenario anyway. For example:

* In relation to part (iii)(a), if all growth in Bexhill is dependent on the Link Road, what elements of the strategy in Chapter 8 can still be implemented? The sum of a number of smaller developments in the town could still be substantial whilst growth in the town centre would still attract traffic movements in to the town, so are these elements that can go ahead or not? There is no clarity or rationale as to what in Chapter 8 is 'saved' under the OSS2 contingency and what is not;

* In relation to part (iii)(b), what scale of development can be accommodated at North-East Bexhill in advance or in the absence of the Link Road? Surely that is a decision that should be made as part of this Core Strategy, since that strategic allocation is a critical part of the overall development strategy;

* In relation to part (iii)(c), why is it appropriate under part (b) for there to be a site specific review of the potential for growth at North-East Bexhill in the absence/delay of the Link Road, but for all other strategic locations to be subject to a blanket 'ban' under parts (c) and (d)?

* In relation to part (iii) (d), the Policy does not specify the methodology to be used in determining the "actual scale of development allowable", but since the philosophy of the Link Road relates to highway capacity, and the Policy refers to this work being done in conjunction with the County Council and Hastings, then the Policy is envisaging that some form of strategic highway model will demonstrate the scale of growth that can be accommodated without the Link Road.

* The problem is that this is simply an unrealistic expectation - Bexhill is a major urban area, and as such, it is not unusual and indeed not inappropriate for different parts of the network to experience different levels of stress and capacity usage at different time, but fundamentally, there is no specific point at which a highway network works acceptably and when it performs unacceptably. A highway modelling exercise cannot provide an answer as to how much growth is acceptable.

We would also wish to reserve the right to submit representations on the Council's transportation evidence base, which we understand is not finished and has not been made available alongside the Pre-Submission consultation.

* In relation to part (iii) (e), it is not clear what a 'pre-Link Road development rate' actually is, nor that there is any substantive evidence which underpins the figures given in Chapter 8. So for example, the rate given at paragraph 8.54 for 2011-2015 is 75 dwellings per annum, but this period straddles the Link Road opening, and there is no technical basis that supports it. Paragraph 8.53 refers to a 'lower rate' of house building before construction of the Link Road rising to 150 dwellings per annum thereafter, but does not actually state what the 'lower rate' is, or where it comes from.

In the light of all of the above, we consider that the second and third criteria of Policy OSS2 are unsound because they are neither Justified nor Effective nor are they consistent with PPS12.

In addition, the inclusion of the policy raises a procedural/legal issue of unsoundness because parts (ii) and (iii) have not been subject to SA.

Paragraph 8.54
Following on from the discussion of build rates and pre/post Link Road scenarios above, there is no evidence that we have seen which supports the projected phasing provisions at paragraph 8.54.

Moreover, we can see no rationale for wanting to artificially restrain housing growth in the early years of the Plan period via this means. The starting point, as per the draft NPPF and 'Planning for Growth' is that sustainable growth should be encouraged to happen at the earliest opportunity, since that growth will encourage investment and jobs, and help to stimulate economic recovery. Aside from the inclusion of employment uses in mixed-use schemes, the construction of new housing creates employment for the workforce involved, stimulates demand in terms of the use of raw materials and resources, and helps to stimulate economic activity in surrounding areas. Moreover, in this case, there is a substantial need for new housing and a backlog of affordable housing need.

In that context, there is no merit whatsoever in this Core Strategy seeking to establish an arbitrary phasing of housebuilding. Although the phasing is purported to be associated with the construction of the Link Road, any planning application (particularly for a major scheme) will need to undertake its own assessment of the transportation effects, and if there is a need for any phasing, or for a cap on the number of units built on any site in advance of the Link Road opening, then that will be a matter for detailed consideration based on hard technical evidence at that stage, and it should not be pre-determined through this Core Strategy.

Paragraph 8.54 should be deleted, since it is unjustified, inappropriate, and inconsistent with national policy.

Policy BX3
Turning to Policy BX3, we have noted elsewhere in our submissions to OSS1 that at the current time, the RSS remains, and the RSS sets a level of housing provision for both the District and the coastal area which is in excess of that now being proposed in the Core Strategy.

Although the Council has produced a Housing Background Paper, we have explained in our submissions to OSS1 that this in fact fails to present any form of robust argument for reducing the scale of growth below the South East Plan level, and indeed conversely in actually provides evidence in respect of the constraining effect that even the South East Plan figures has on meeting housing need.

At this stage, it is not known when the South-East Plan will be formally revoked, but in any event, the scale of housing growth at Bexhill should achieve at least the minimum set out through that process which would equate to around 3,410-3,630 in total (i.e. 3,100-3,300 as set out in the Core Strategy Directions of 2008, plus an allowance for an additional two years for the extended plan period to 2028 at the same rate i.e. 310-330).

Criterion (ii) of BX3 should be amended accordingly.

Criterion (ii) should also be amended to delete the specific reference to the timing of delivery of all units in Bexhill being linked to the phasing of the Link Road and the provisions of paragraph 8.54. As far as we are aware, there is no limit on the speed with which housing within the existing urban area might be developed, and any restrictions in respect of specific strategic development sites should be examined and justified in relation to those individual sites, not applied to Bexhill as a whole. This part of Policy BX3 is therefore not Justified.

In respect of Criterion (iii) of BX3, we are concerned that the Core Strategy is premised upon an unrealistic expectation of the rate of delivery and quantum of new housing that may be delivered within the Bexhill urban area. Our examination of the Council's 5 year housing land supply assessment (current base date April 2011) shows a reliance both on historic allocations and sites without planning permission where there is no evidence that development will occur, and a reliance on sites with planning permission for C2 rather than C3 use.

More specifically, criterion (iii) refers to the possibility of an urban extension to the north of Bexhill. This refers to an area of land shown on the key diagram which has not at any time during the Core Strategy process been promoted by the landowners or a developer as a strategic housing site, and there are therefore serious questions over whether or not this land is 'available' (the Council's SHLAA provides no evidence that it is).

Moreover, the proposed northern growth area occupies a peripheral location that relates poorly to the existing built settlement, offers few opportunities for walking and cycling, it is remote from existing services (and where the principle means of access seems to be premised upon access to the Link Road, thereby further undermining the sustainability of the location), and it utilises an area of land of relatively high landscape value. For all of these reasons, it does not represent a sustainable or appropriate site for strategic housing development.

Accordingly, reference to North Bexhill should be removed from criterion (iii), because the location is fundamentally inappropriate.

We have already noted in respect of our comments on paragraph 8.54 that there is no rationale for seeking to phase strategic housing delivery, and that the need for affordable housing, and the positive framework set by "Planning for Growth" and the NPPF suggests a strong rationale for bringing strategic development at Bexhill forward as soon as practically possible.

We have also touched on the fact that we have concerns over the robustness of the Council's 5 year land supply. According to the Council's 5 year land supply assessment, there is a 5 year requirement of 1,415 dwellings and a supply of 1,510 dwellings, but as our emerging planning application will demonstrate, the true availability of land is less than 1,510, whilst the 5 year requirement (calculated on the 'Sedgefield' basis) is greater than 1,415. Irrespective of our arguments on these matters, however, even on the Council's own figures, the surplus of supply at 7% is less than the 20% required under the emerging NPPF, and therefore there is still a demonstrable shortfall in the short-term land supply position, which the Council is seeking to exacerbate by restricting the speed with which strategic sites can come forward.

We understand that the North-East strategic allocation may be constrained by a lack of road capacity, and that the Council consider that delivery of this development is inextricably allied to delivery of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road. The same however is not true of West Bexhill, which is suitable and available for delivery now.

Within the policy context outlined above, and in the light of the deficit in the short-term land supply, this Core Strategy should not be relying upon a further Site Allocations process to bring forward a strategic allocation at West Bexhill. Rather, the allocation should be made as part of this Core Strategy. The boundary of the proposed strategic allocation is shown at Appendix 1 to these submissions.

Summary

1. The Council's strategy for Bexhill as set out in Policy BX3 and Policy OSS2 in
respect of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road are intertwined in the Core Strategy.
These submissions therefore consider both issues together.

2. Our objections to OSS2 are as follows:

(1) That in principle policy OSS2 is an inappropriate policy to include in the
Core Strategy, because it effectively provides for two very different Core
Strategies to be followed, depending upon the eventual decision of the
Bexhill-Hastings Link Road;

(2) That parts (ii) and (iii) of OSS2 in respect of the alternative Core Strategy
that arises in the absence of the Link Road have not been subject to
Sustainability Appraisal;

(3) That Part (iii) of the Policy in any event provides an inappropriate and
essentially unworkable contingency scenario for the Bexhill area which is
not Justified, and nor will it be Effective in delivering the housing strategy
that the area needs. Strategic growth at West Bexhill is not dependent
upon the provision of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road.
3. Our objections to BX3 are as follows:

(1) That the overall scale of housing growth for Bexhill should be increased in
line with our objections to OSS1 in respect of the District -wide housing
strategy (criteria ii of BX3);

(2) That the timing of construction of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road should
not dictate the precise number of houses to be provided, in accordance
with our related submissions regarding OSS2 (criteria ii of BX3);

(3) That the policy (and strategy generally) places over-reliance upon the
availability of development opportunities within the existing urban area of
Bexhill which are unlikely to be delivered (criteria iii of BX3);

(4) That the policy should not be referring to an inappropriate and
undeliverable growth location at North Bexhill (criteria iii of BX3);

(5) That the scale, timing and location of development west of Bexhill should
be established as part of this Core Strategy as a strategic allocation, and
not through a subsequent Site Allocation (criteria iii of BX3).

At the outset, it would be appropriate to make clear that the premise in the Core Strategy that all strategic scale development in Bexhill is dependent upon the delivery of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road is simply not accepted, and nor does the Council's evidence base contain any information to support its position.

It is this unsubstantiated premise that underlines the substance of Part (iii) of Policy OSS2, which basically says that in the absence of the Link Road no strategic sites can come forward at Bexhill, and it is this unsubstantiated premise that underpins the phasing provisions at paragraph 8.54 and criteria (ii) of Policy BX3.

At earlier stages of the Core Strategy process, we have submitted provisional transportation strategy work that shows the potential of a strategic site at West Bexhill to be delivered irrespective of the construction of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road. As part of the preparation of a planning application for West Bexhill, our clients' Transport Consultants, Peter Brett Associates, are updating their highway impact assessments based upon the trip assignments being used by East Sussex County Council in their own modelling work for the Link Road. Even using the County Council's own baseline information, the assessment work for West Bexhill is continuing to show that a strategic development of some 450 new homes (and commercial uses) can be accommodated without detriment to the local highway network, and, significantly, that flows on the network on the eastern side of Bexhill are not materially affected by the construction of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road.

The findings (based on zero modal shift, and therefore representing worst-case scenarios) show both that the impact of the development in terms of east-bound trips towards Hastings is minimal, and the lack of significant difference between the 'with the Link Road' and 'without the Link Road' scenarios.

This work is still being refined, but will be presented to the Council as part of the forthcoming West Bexhill planning application, and through that mechanism the evidence will be available to inform debate at the Core Strategy Examination. We would also wish to reserve the right to submit representations on the Council's transportation evidence base, which we understand is not finished and has not been made available alongside the Pre-Submission consultation.

Within that context, we turn to consider firstly Policy OSS2, followed by paragraph 8.54 and then Policy BX3.

Policy OSS2
Policy OSS1 sets out a clear spatial development strategy which establishes that by 2028, provision will be made for up to 4,100 new homes and 100,000 sq m of new business floorspace. Although we object to the number of new homes, as per our representations to OSS1, the policy itself (coupled with the distribution of development in Figure 8) is relatively clear and unambiguous as to what the Core Strategy is going to achieve.

Policy OSS2, however, states that if the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road is delayed, or otherwise does not come forward as expected, then a completely different Core Strategy might be pursued, but no details are given as to what that different Core Strategy might actually contain, nor what its practical implications might be.

Even leaving aside the very unhelpful lack of clarity that OSS2 creates, the inclusion of OSS2 raises two fundamental concerns:

(a) Firstly, that it is inappropriate to have a policy in a Plan, the implementation of which, would critically undermine other aspects of the Plan and the Spatial Vision; and

(b) That it is not possible to undertake any sort of credible Sustainability Assessment of the effects of Policy OSS2, because the Policy does not actually set out what the effects of its implementation would be.

In relation to the first point, we understand that Core Strategies are supposed to contain an element of flexibility to cater for changing circumstances, but the inclusion of OSS2 is essentially to put forward two completely different Core Strategies. If the Link Road is built to the timetable currently envisaged, then the Core Strategy will proceed in accordance with OSS1. If the Link Road is not built at all, or is significantly delayed, then the strategy set out in OSS1 will not be pursued, but the policy does not explain clearly what alternative Core Strategy is to be pursued, largely because decisions as to the scale and location of growth are then to be delegated to a separate highway modelling exercise to be undertaken in conjunction with the County Council and Hastings (criterion d of part iii of OSS2) .

Whilst there is no certainty as to what this second 'fallback' Core Strategy might be, the wording of the policy makes clear that the development strategy would be very different to OSS1, and therefore in effect, this Core Strategy contains two development strategies, one set out in OSS1, and one as yet to be disclosed that could arise as a result of OSS2.

This leads on to the second concern above, that in the absence of any confirmation as to what the alternative strategy would be, it is impossible to submit OSS2 to any form of sensible Sustainability Appraisal.

It is evident when reading the published Sustainability Appraisal that the SA has simply ignored the consequences of parts (ii) and (iii) of the Policy, and all of the analysis relates solely to the impact of the Link Road itself. Thus, for example, on page 143 of the SA, in response to Objective 1 (opportunity to live in a decent home), the assessment for OSS1 records a positive result, and on page 144, the assessment for OSS2 records the same positive result, on the basis that the Link Road is associated with delivering new housing. However, the converse position presented by OSS2, that without the Link Road housing provision at Bexhill will be substantially reduced, is not assessed.

Similar discrepancies occur throughout the assessment process, with OSS2 only being considered against the first part of the policy which presumes the Link Road comes forward, not the remainder of the Policy which presumes that it does not.

Of course, by the time that this Core Strategy comes to be examined, a decision on whether or not the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road is to receive funding, and a broad timetable for delivery, will be known. Depending upon the outcome of that decision, Policy OSS2 (or potentially Policy OSS1) is likely to become redundant anyway.

For the above reasons, we consider that the inclusion of OSS2 is inappropriate, and the policy should be deleted.

If, notwithstanding the above, Policy OSS2 were to be retained in the Plan, then we have concerns as to whether or not the methodology set out in criterion (iii) actually provides a workable contingency scenario anyway. For example:

* In relation to part (iii)(a), if all growth in Bexhill is dependent on the Link Road, what elements of the strategy in Chapter 8 can still be implemented? The sum of a number of smaller developments in the town could still be substantial whilst growth in the town centre would still attract traffic movements in to the town, so are these elements that can go ahead or not? There is no clarity or rationale as to what in Chapter 8 is 'saved' under the OSS2 contingency and what is not;

* In relation to part (iii)(b), what scale of development can be accommodated at North-East Bexhill in advance or in the absence of the Link Road? Surely that is a decision that should be made as part of this Core Strategy, since that strategic allocation is a critical part of the overall development strategy;

* In relation to part (iii)(c), why is it appropriate under part (b) for there to be a site specific review of the potential for growth at North-East Bexhill in the absence/delay of the Link Road, but for all other strategic locations to be subject to a blanket 'ban' under parts (c) and (d)?

* In relation to part (iii) (d), the Policy does not specify the methodology to be used in determining the "actual scale of development allowable", but since the philosophy of the Link Road relates to highway capacity, and the Policy refers to this work being done in conjunction with the County Council and Hastings, then the Policy is envisaging that some form of strategic highway model will demonstrate the scale of growth that can be accommodated without the Link Road.

* The problem is that this is simply an unrealistic expectation - Bexhill is a major urban area, and as such, it is not unusual and indeed not inappropriate for different parts of the network to experience different levels of stress and capacity usage at different time, but fundamentally, there is no specific point at which a highway network works acceptably and when it performs unacceptably. A highway modelling exercise cannot provide an answer as to how much growth is acceptable.

We would also wish to reserve the right to submit representations on the Council's transportation evidence base, which we understand is not finished and has not been made available alongside the Pre-Submission consultation.

* In relation to part (iii) (e), it is not clear what a 'pre-Link Road development rate' actually is, nor that there is any substantive evidence which underpins the figures given in Chapter 8. So for example, the rate given at paragraph 8.54 for 2011-2015 is 75 dwellings per annum, but this period straddles the Link Road opening, and there is no technical basis that supports it. Paragraph 8.53 refers to a 'lower rate' of house building before construction of the Link Road rising to 150 dwellings per annum thereafter, but does not actually state what the 'lower rate' is, or where it comes from.

In the light of all of the above, we consider that the second and third criteria of Policy OSS2 are unsound because they are neither Justified nor Effective nor are they consistent with PPS12.

In addition, the inclusion of the policy raises a procedural/legal issue of unsoundness because parts (ii) and (iii) have not been subject to SA.

Paragraph 8.54
Following on from the discussion of build rates and pre/post Link Road scenarios above, there is no evidence that we have seen which supports the projected phasing provisions at paragraph 8.54.

Moreover, we can see no rationale for wanting to artificially restrain housing growth in the early years of the Plan period via this means. The starting point, as per the draft NPPF and 'Planning for Growth' is that sustainable growth should be encouraged to happen at the earliest opportunity, since that growth will encourage investment and jobs, and help to stimulate economic recovery. Aside from the inclusion of employment uses in mixed-use schemes, the construction of new housing creates employment for the workforce involved, stimulates demand in terms of the use of raw materials and resources, and helps to stimulate economic activity in surrounding areas. Moreover, in this case, there is a substantial need for new housing and a backlog of affordable housing need.

In that context, there is no merit whatsoever in this Core Strategy seeking to establish an arbitrary phasing of housebuilding. Although the phasing is purported to be associated with the construction of the Link Road, any planning application (particularly for a major scheme) will need to undertake its own assessment of the transportation effects, and if there is a need for any phasing, or for a cap on the number of units built on any site in advance of the Link Road opening, then that will be a matter for detailed consideration based on hard technical evidence at that stage, and it should not be pre-determined through this Core Strategy.

Paragraph 8.54 should be deleted, since it is unjustified, inappropriate, and inconsistent with national policy.

Policy BX3
Turning to Policy BX3, we have noted elsewhere in our submissions to OSS1 that at the current time, the RSS remains, and the RSS sets a level of housing provision for both the District and the coastal area which is in excess of that now being proposed in the Core Strategy.

Although the Council has produced a Housing Background Paper, we have explained in our submissions to OSS1 that this in fact fails to present any form of robust argument for reducing the scale of growth below the South East Plan level, and indeed conversely in actually provides evidence in respect of the constraining effect that even the South East Plan figures has on meeting housing need.

At this stage, it is not known when the South-East Plan will be formally revoked, but in any event, the scale of housing growth at Bexhill should achieve at least the minimum set out through that process which would equate to around 3,410-3,630 in total (i.e. 3,100-3,300 as set out in the Core Strategy Directions of 2008, plus an allowance for an additional two years for the extended plan period to 2028 at the same rate i.e. 310-330).

Criterion (ii) of BX3 should be amended accordingly.

Criterion (ii) should also be amended to delete the specific reference to the timing of delivery of all units in Bexhill being linked to the phasing of the Link Road and the provisions of paragraph 8.54. As far as we are aware, there is no limit on the speed with which housing within the existing urban area might be developed, and any restrictions in respect of specific strategic development sites should be examined and justified in relation to those individual sites, not applied to Bexhill as a whole. This part of Policy BX3 is therefore not Justified.

In respect of Criterion (iii) of BX3, we are concerned that the Core Strategy is premised upon an unrealistic expectation of the rate of delivery and quantum of new housing that may be delivered within the Bexhill urban area. Our examination of the Council's 5 year housing land supply assessment (current base date April 2011) shows a reliance both on historic allocations and sites without planning permission where there is no evidence that development will occur, and a reliance on sites with planning permission for C2 rather than C3 use.

More specifically, criterion (iii) refers to the possibility of an urban extension to the north of Bexhill. This refers to an area of land shown on the key diagram which has not at any time during the Core Strategy process been promoted by the landowners or a developer as a strategic housing site, and there are therefore serious questions over whether or not this land is 'available' (the Council's SHLAA provides no evidence that it is).

Moreover, the proposed northern growth area occupies a peripheral location that relates poorly to the existing built settlement, offers few opportunities for walking and cycling, it is remote from existing services (and where the principle means of access seems to be premised upon access to the Link Road, thereby further undermining the sustainability of the location), and it utilises an area of land of relatively high landscape value. For all of these reasons, it does not represent a sustainable or appropriate site for strategic housing development.

Accordingly, reference to North Bexhill should be removed from criterion (iii), because the location is fundamentally inappropriate.

We have already noted in respect of our comments on paragraph 8.54 that there is no rationale for seeking to phase strategic housing delivery, and that the need for affordable housing, and the positive framework set by "Planning for Growth" and the NPPF suggests a strong rationale for bringing strategic development at Bexhill forward as soon as practically possible.

We have also touched on the fact that we have concerns over the robustness of the Council's 5 year land supply. According to the Council's 5 year land supply assessment, there is a 5 year requirement of 1,415 dwellings and a supply of 1,510 dwellings, but as our emerging planning application will demonstrate, the true availability of land is less than 1,510, whilst the 5 year requirement (calculated on the 'Sedgefield' basis) is greater than 1,415. Irrespective of our arguments on these matters, however, even on the Council's own figures, the surplus of supply at 7% is less than the 20% required under the emerging NPPF, and therefore there is still a demonstrable shortfall in the short-term land supply position, which the Council is seeking to exacerbate by restricting the speed with which strategic sites can come forward.

We understand that the North-East strategic allocation may be constrained by a lack of road capacity, and that the Council consider that delivery of this development is inextricably allied to delivery of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road. The same however is not true of West Bexhill, which is suitable and available for delivery now.

Within the policy context outlined above, and in the light of the deficit in the short-term land supply, this Core Strategy should not be relying upon a further Site Allocations process to bring forward a strategic allocation at West Bexhill. Rather, the allocation should be made as part of this Core Strategy. The boundary of the proposed strategic allocation is shown at Appendix 1 to these submissions.

Summary

1. The Council's strategy for Bexhill as set out in Policy BX3 and Policy OSS2 in
respect of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road are intertwined in the Core Strategy.
These submissions therefore consider both issues together.

2. Our objections to OSS2 are as follows:

(1) That in principle policy OSS2 is an inappropriate policy to include in the
Core Strategy, because it effectively provides for two very different Core
Strategies to be followed, depending upon the eventual decision of the
Bexhill-Hastings Link Road;

(2) That parts (ii) and (iii) of OSS2 in respect of the alternative Core Strategy
that arises in the absence of the Link Road have not been subject to
Sustainability Appraisal;

(3) That Part (iii) of the Policy in any event provides an inappropriate and
essentially unworkable contingency scenario for the Bexhill area which is
not Justified, and nor will it be Effective in delivering the housing strategy
that the area needs. Strategic growth at West Bexhill is not dependent
upon the provision of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road.
3. Our objections to BX3 are as follows:

(1) That the overall scale of housing growth for Bexhill should be increased in
line with our objections to OSS1 in respect of the District -wide housing
strategy (criteria ii of BX3);

(2) That the timing of construction of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road should
not dictate the precise number of houses to be provided, in accordance
with our related submissions regarding OSS2 (criteria ii of BX3);

(3) That the policy (and strategy generally) places over-reliance upon the
availability of development opportunities within the existing urban area of
Bexhill which are unlikely to be delivered (criteria iii of BX3);

(4) That the policy should not be referring to an inappropriate and
undeliverable growth location at North Bexhill (criteria iii of BX3);

(5) That the scale, timing and location of development west of Bexhill should
be established as part of this Core Strategy as a strategic allocation, and
not through a subsequent Site Allocation (criteria iii of BX3).

At the outset, it would be appropriate to make clear that the premise in the Core Strategy that all strategic scale development in Bexhill is dependent upon the delivery of the Bexhill Hastings Link Road is simply not accepted, and nor does the Council's evidence base contain any information to support its position.

It is this unsubstantiated premise that underlines the substance of Part (iii) of Policy OSS2, which basically says that in the absence of the Link Road no strategic sites can come forward at Bexhill, and it is this unsubstantiated premise that underpins the phasing provisions at paragraph 8.54 and criteria (ii) of Policy BX3.

At earlier stages of the Core Strategy process, we have submitted provisional transportation strategy work that shows the potential of a strategic site at West Bexhill to be delivered irrespective of the construction of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road. As part of the preparation of a planning application for West Bexhill, our clients' Transport Consultants, Peter Brett Associates, are updating their highway impact assessments based upon the trip assignments being used by East Sussex County Council in their own modelling work for the Link Road. Even using the County Council's own baseline information, the assessment work for West Bexhill is continuing to show that a strategic development of some 450 new homes (and commercial uses) can be accommodated without detriment to the local highway network, and, significantly, that flows on the network on the eastern side of Bexhill are not materially affected by the construction of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road.

The findings (based on zero modal shift, and therefore representing worst-case scenarios) show both that the impact of the development in terms of east-bound trips towards Hastings is minimal, and the lack of significant difference between the 'with the Link Road' and 'without the Link Road' scenarios.

This work is still being refined, but will be presented to the Council as part of the forthcoming West Bexhill planning application, and through that mechanism the evidence will be available to inform debate at the Core Strategy Examination. We would also wish to reserve the right to submit representations on the Council's transportation evidence base, which we understand is not finished and has not been made available alongside the Pre-Submission consultation.

Within that context, we turn to consider firstly Policy OSS2, followed by paragraph 8.54 and then Policy BX3.

Policy OSS2
Policy OSS1 sets out a clear spatial development strategy which establishes that by 2028, provision will be made for up to 4,100 new homes and 100,000 sq m of new business floorspace. Although we object to the number of new homes, as per our representations to OSS1, the policy itself (coupled with the distribution of development in Figure 8) is relatively clear and unambiguous as to what the Core Strategy is going to achieve.

Policy OSS2, however, states that if the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road is delayed, or otherwise does not come forward as expected, then a completely different Core Strategy might be pursued, but no details are given as to what that different Core Strategy might actually contain, nor what its practical implications might be.

Even leaving aside the very unhelpful lack of clarity that OSS2 creates, the inclusion of OSS2 raises two fundamental concerns:

(a) Firstly, that it is inappropriate to have a policy in a Plan, the implementation of which, would critically undermine other aspects of the Plan and the Spatial Vision; and

(b) That it is not possible to undertake any sort of credible Sustainability Assessment of the effects of Policy OSS2, because the Policy does not actually set out what the effects of its implementation would be.

In relation to the first point, we understand that Core Strategies are supposed to contain an element of flexibility to cater for changing circumstances, but the inclusion of OSS2 is essentially to put forward two completely different Core Strategies. If the Link Road is built to the timetable currently envisaged, then the Core Strategy will proceed in accordance with OSS1. If the Link Road is not built at all, or is significantly delayed, then the strategy set out in OSS1 will not be pursued, but the policy does not explain clearly what alternative Core Strategy is to be pursued, largely because decisions as to the scale and location of growth are then to be delegated to a separate highway modelling exercise to be undertaken in conjunction with the County Council and Hastings (criterion d of part iii of OSS2) .

Whilst there is no certainty as to what this second 'fallback' Core Strategy might be, the wording of the policy makes clear that the development strategy would be very different to OSS1, and therefore in effect, this Core Strategy contains two development strategies, one set out in OSS1, and one as yet to be disclosed that could arise as a result of OSS2.

This leads on to the second concern above, that in the absence of any confirmation as to what the alternative strategy would be, it is impossible to submit OSS2 to any form of sensible Sustainability Appraisal.

It is evident when reading the published Sustainability Appraisal that the SA has simply ignored the consequences of parts (ii) and (iii) of the Policy, and all of the analysis relates solely to the impact of the Link Road itself. Thus, for example, on page 143 of the SA, in response to Objective 1 (opportunity to live in a decent home), the assessment for OSS1 records a positive result, and on page 144, the assessment for OSS2 records the same positive result, on the basis that the Link Road is associated with delivering new housing. However, the converse position presented by OSS2, that without the Link Road housing provision at Bexhill will be substantially reduced, is not assessed.

Similar discrepancies occur throughout the assessment process, with OSS2 only being considered against the first part of the policy which presumes the Link Road comes forward, not the remainder of the Policy which presumes that it does not.

Of course, by the time that this Core Strategy comes to be examined, a decision on whether or not the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road is to receive funding, and a broad timetable for delivery, will be known. Depending upon the outcome of that decision, Policy OSS2 (or potentially Policy OSS1) is likely to become redundant anyway.

For the above reasons, we consider that the inclusion of OSS2 is inappropriate, and the policy should be deleted.

If, notwithstanding the above, Policy OSS2 were to be retained in the Plan, then we have concerns as to whether or not the methodology set out in criterion (iii) actually provides a workable contingency scenario anyway. For example:

* In relation to part (iii)(a), if all growth in Bexhill is dependent on the Link Road, what elements of the strategy in Chapter 8 can still be implemented? The sum of a number of smaller developments in the town could still be substantial whilst growth in the town centre would still attract traffic movements in to the town, so are these elements that can go ahead or not? There is no clarity or rationale as to what in Chapter 8 is 'saved' under the OSS2 contingency and what is not;

* In relation to part (iii)(b), what scale of development can be accommodated at North-East Bexhill in advance or in the absence of the Link Road? Surely that is a decision that should be made as part of this Core Strategy, since that strategic allocation is a critical part of the overall development strategy;

* In relation to part (iii)(c), why is it appropriate under part (b) for there to be a site specific review of the potential for growth at North-East Bexhill in the absence/delay of the Link Road, but for all other strategic locations to be subject to a blanket 'ban' under parts (c) and (d)?

* In relation to part (iii) (d), the Policy does not specify the methodology to be used in determining the "actual scale of development allowable", but since the philosophy of the Link Road relates to highway capacity, and the Policy refers to this work being done in conjunction with the County Council and Hastings, then the Policy is envisaging that some form of strategic highway model will demonstrate the scale of growth that can be accommodated without the Link Road.

* The problem is that this is simply an unrealistic expectation - Bexhill is a major urban area, and as such, it is not unusual and indeed not inappropriate for different parts of the network to experience different levels of stress and capacity usage at different time, but fundamentally, there is no specific point at which a highway network works acceptably and when it performs unacceptably. A highway modelling exercise cannot provide an answer as to how much growth is acceptable.

We would also wish to reserve the right to submit representations on the Council's transportation evidence base, which we understand is not finished and has not been made available alongside the Pre-Submission consultation.

* In relation to part (iii) (e), it is not clear what a 'pre-Link Road development rate' actually is, nor that there is any substantive evidence which underpins the figures given in Chapter 8. So for example, the rate given at paragraph 8.54 for 2011-2015 is 75 dwellings per annum, but this period straddles the Link Road opening, and there is no technical basis that supports it. Paragraph 8.53 refers to a 'lower rate' of house building before construction of the Link Road rising to 150 dwellings per annum thereafter, but does not actually state what the 'lower rate' is, or where it comes from.

In the light of all of the above, we consider that the second and third criteria of Policy OSS2 are unsound because they are neither Justified nor Effective nor are they consistent with PPS12.

In addition, the inclusion of the policy raises a procedural/legal issue of unsoundness because parts (ii) and (iii) have not been subject to SA.

Paragraph 8.54
Following on from the discussion of build rates and pre/post Link Road scenarios above, there is no evidence that we have seen which supports the projected phasing provisions at paragraph 8.54.

Moreover, we can see no rationale for wanting to artificially restrain housing growth in the early years of the Plan period via this means. The starting point, as per the draft NPPF and 'Planning for Growth' is that sustainable growth should be encouraged to happen at the earliest opportunity, since that growth will encourage investment and jobs, and help to stimulate economic recovery. Aside from the inclusion of employment uses in mixed-use schemes, the construction of new housing creates employment for the workforce involved, stimulates demand in terms of the use of raw materials and resources, and helps to stimulate economic activity in surrounding areas. Moreover, in this case, there is a substantial need for new housing and a backlog of affordable housing need.

In that context, there is no merit whatsoever in this Core Strategy seeking to establish an arbitrary phasing of housebuilding. Although the phasing is purported to be associated with the construction of the Link Road, any planning application (particularly for a major scheme) will need to undertake its own assessment of the transportation effects, and if there is a need for any phasing, or for a cap on the number of units built on any site in advance of the Link Road opening, then that will be a matter for detailed consideration based on hard technical evidence at that stage, and it should not be pre-determined through this Core Strategy.

Paragraph 8.54 should be deleted, since it is unjustified, inappropriate, and inconsistent with national policy.

Policy BX3
Turning to Policy BX3, we have noted elsewhere in our submissions to OSS1 that at the current time, the RSS remains, and the RSS sets a level of housing provision for both the District and the coastal area which is in excess of that now being proposed in the Core Strategy.

Although the Council has produced a Housing Background Paper, we have explained in our submissions to OSS1 that this in fact fails to present any form of robust argument for reducing the scale of growth below the South East Plan level, and indeed conversely in actually provides evidence in respect of the constraining effect that even the South East Plan figures has on meeting housing need.

At this stage, it is not known when the South-East Plan will be formally revoked, but in any event, the scale of housing growth at Bexhill should achieve at least the minimum set out through that process which would equate to around 3,410-3,630 in total (i.e. 3,100-3,300 as set out in the Core Strategy Directions of 2008, plus an allowance for an additional two years for the extended plan period to 2028 at the same rate i.e. 310-330).

Criterion (ii) of BX3 should be amended accordingly.

Criterion (ii) should also be amended to delete the specific reference to the timing of delivery of all units in Bexhill being linked to the phasing of the Link Road and the provisions of paragraph 8.54. As far as we are aware, there is no limit on the speed with which housing within the existing urban area might be developed, and any restrictions in respect of specific strategic development sites should be examined and justified in relation to those individual sites, not applied to Bexhill as a whole. This part of Policy BX3 is therefore not Justified.

In respect of Criterion (iii) of BX3, we are concerned that the Core Strategy is premised upon an unrealistic expectation of the rate of delivery and quantum of new housing that may be delivered within the Bexhill urban area. Our examination of the Council's 5 year housing land supply assessment (current base date April 2011) shows a reliance both on historic allocations and sites without planning permission where there is no evidence that development will occur, and a reliance on sites with planning permission for C2 rather than C3 use.

More specifically, criterion (iii) refers to the possibility of an urban extension to the north of Bexhill. This refers to an area of land shown on the key diagram which has not at any time during the Core Strategy process been promoted by the landowners or a developer as a strategic housing site, and there are therefore serious questions over whether or not this land is 'available' (the Council's SHLAA provides no evidence that it is).

Moreover, the proposed northern growth area occupies a peripheral location that relates poorly to the existing built settlement, offers few opportunities for walking and cycling, it is remote from existing services (and where the principle means of access seems to be premised upon access to the Link Road, thereby further undermining the sustainability of the location), and it utilises an area of land of relatively high landscape value. For all of these reasons, it does not represent a sustainable or appropriate site for strategic housing development.

Accordingly, reference to North Bexhill should be removed from criterion (iii), because the location is fundamentally inappropriate.

We have already noted in respect of our comments on paragraph 8.54 that there is no rationale for seeking to phase strategic housing delivery, and that the need for affordable housing, and the positive framework set by "Planning for Growth" and the NPPF suggests a strong rationale for bringing strategic development at Bexhill forward as soon as practically possible.

We have also touched on the fact that we have concerns over the robustness of the Council's 5 year land supply. According to the Council's 5 year land supply assessment, there is a 5 year requirement of 1,415 dwellings and a supply of 1,510 dwellings, but as our emerging planning application will demonstrate, the true availability of land is less than 1,510, whilst the 5 year requirement (calculated on the 'Sedgefield' basis) is greater than 1,415. Irrespective of our arguments on these matters, however, even on the Council's own figures, the surplus of supply at 7% is less than the 20% required under the emerging NPPF, and therefore there is still a demonstrable shortfall in the short-term land supply position, which the Council is seeking to exacerbate by restricting the speed with which strategic sites can come forward.

We understand that the North-East strategic allocation may be constrained by a lack of road capacity, and that the Council consider that delivery of this development is inextricably allied to delivery of the Bexhill-Hastings Link Road. The same however is not true of West Bexhill, which is suitable and available for delivery now.

Within the policy context outlined above, and in the light of the deficit in the short-term land supply, this Core Strategy should not be relying upon a further Site Allocations process to bring forward a strategic allocation at West Bexhill. Rather, the allocation should be made as part of this Core Strategy. The boundary of the proposed strategic allocation is shown at Appendix 1 to these submissions.

Paragraph 14.27 of the draft Core Strategy refers to the Council's 2007 Open Space, Sport and Recreation Study.

Paragraph 14.28 goes on to state that the Council has "adopted the quantitative standards" set out in that study. Whilst this statement may be true in respect of the Council's Leisure Department's function, it does not appear to be true in terms of the Council's planning functions, because the Open Space Study does not appear to have been adopted as SPD, and nor does there ever appear to have been any consultation on its findings.

As a piece of work to support the Council in its leisure services function, the report may well have merit. As a piece of work to support the application of an open space standard for planning purposes, the analysis is severely lacking in rigour, not least because in many instances the standard is not based on evidence of need, but on the perceptions of respondents to a survey, and also because in many instances the rationale behind the suggested targets simply makes no sense.

So for example:

* Parks and Gardens - for this item, the results of the survey suggest no shortage of provision. There is some concern regarding a lack of access in East Rother, although the analysis suggests this is almost negligible (0.04ha per 1000 population). In any event, there is a proposal for a new Country Park, not referred to in the analysis for Parks and Gardens, to the east of Bexhill which would make a major contribution towards increased provision).

Within the analysis presented in Appendix Gi for Parks and Gardens, the only rationale put forward at all for a requirement for additional land for Parks and Gardens appears to come from the 'benchmarking' review, which basically means that the standard exists not because there is any particular need identified in Rother, but because other authorities seek provision. This is very much the antithesis of the local evidence approach required under PPS12.

Irrespective of the above, there does not appear to have been any thought as to how such a standard might be applied in practice, given the general absence of large strategic sites (other than North-East Bexhill, which is related to the new Country Park referred to above). A number of medium sized/small developments, each delivering fragments of notional 'Parks and gardens', would not actually address supply, and since East Sussex County Council is already addressing the provision of a new country park, there is also no justification under the CIL regulations for financial contributions.

* Natural and semi-natural open space - As far as we can ascertain from Appendix G(iv), there is already a considerable surplus of natural and semi-natural green space across the District as a whole. There is also no shortfall identified for any of the sub-areas. So since there is a surplus all round against the Local Authority's standard, there is no justification for seeking more in any circumstances.

The attempt at a justification in Appendix G(iv) is largely unintelligible, but the relevant text states: "Due to the significantly rural nature of the district the standard of 2ha is aimed at new developments of large scale to ensure residential expansion is not at the cost of open space". This appears to suggest that large scale residential expansion necessarily impacts upon the resource of natural/semi-natural open space, but since the existing sites upon which the analysis is based are defined and mapped, the need would only arise in the event of one of the existing defined sites being lost and needing to be replaced, which is an entirely different and site specific response to open space provision, not something to be set out in a generic standard, and certainly not used in a standard when there is an overall surplus of provision.

For both reasons, therefore, this aspect of the "adopted standards" is not justified, appropriate, or CIL compliant.

* Amenity Green Space - The analysis at Appendix G(i) notes that in terms of the survey results, there was "a fairly mixed response" in terms of whether people felt there was too much or too little. The analysis reveals that the NPFA standard for incidental amenity green space would be 0.4 ha per 1000 population.

Notwithstanding that background, Appendix G(i) attempts to justify a standard of 1.73 ha on the basis of:

(a) The erroneous use of the 'benchmarking' approach - i.e. because other authorities have a higher standard, Rother should have one too. Not only is this an unsound methodology in any event, as previously alluded to above, but in this case the 'benchmarking' revealed standards of between 0.5 and 1.6 ha per 1000, and therefore the chosen standard of 1.73 ha exceeds anything revealed by that comparison anyway;
(b) The inexplicable adoption of the current level of provision at Battle, which is 1.73 ha per 1000 population, as the standard to be applied everywhere else in the District.

So in actual fact, the justification for the standard has nothing to do with levels of need or levels of provision, but basically an aspiration that all parts of the District should be like Battle. This approach is incompatible with the evidenced based requirement for policy in PPS12, and CIL requirements.

* Outdoor Sports Facilities - the background to this standard is an NPFA standard that would require 1.62 ha per 1000 population, and an existing level of provision of 2.76 ha per 1000 population. The survey results were mixed, with 52% stating there was inadequate provision, and 48% stating there was enough.

The proposed standard of 2.97 ha per 1000 is acknowledged to be high (compared to other authorities) and is said to be "for broad planning need only", although it is not clear what that means. The justification refers to consultation responses emphasising a lack of provision, although this conclusion does not appear to be borne out from the analysis presented.

Ultimately, the standard of 2.97 ha for the urban areas is chosen solely on the basis that this is the existing level of provision in Rye, and the justification says that the standard is set at this highest level "to protect current provision while attempting to offer standardisation across the District."

Again, therefore, the justification is erroneous, and bears no relationship whatsoever to need and supply. The approach is simply to take the highest rate of existing provision in any one settlement, and apply it to the others to "offer standardisation". This approach is inconsistent with a proper evidence-based approach to policy and the CIL regulations.

In addition to the above, we have reservations in any event regarding the over-reliance placed on the views of surveys in this form of work, firstly because the response sample is very small (705 responses were received, out of a total of 40,300 households in the district, which equates to just 1.7% of all households), secondly because inevitably those that do respond tend to be those people with a particular interest (out of the 5400 surveys issued, what did what did the 4,695 households who didn't respond think?), and thirdly because the information provided is obviously highly subjective. Notwithstanding these significant limitations, the responses to the survey are regularly given undue weight in determining the proposed open space standard.

In the light of the above, the first element of our objection is simply that the "adopted standards" are based upon a wholly inadequate evidence base.

Our second concerns stems from the fact that neither the policy itself nor the supporting text actually sets out what the proposed standard is, and reliance is instead placed upon the background document referred to above to set the standard. This approach means that the standard could in fact change at any time, simply by the Council issuing a revised evidence base, which would not itself be open to any form of consultation or examination. In essence, policy would be being set 'behind the scenes', and the changed policy implemented through CO3 without any recourse for testing. If the Council is to set a standard on open space, then the standard needs to form part of the policy, not part of a 'bottom draw' document.

Thirdly, not only is the policy inappropriate in terms of relying on the standards examined above, but the policy does not appear to provide any mechanism by which a surplus of open space in any particular locality can act as mitigation to the provision of new open space. It refers to "adopted standards" being "maintained", but since the adopted standards are in many instances based upon an acknowledged position of surplus, applicants are being required to maintain a surplus, which is contrary to the CIL regulations.

Paragraph 14.27 of the draft Core Strategy refers to the Council's 2007 Open Space, Sport and Recreation Study.

Paragraph 14.28 goes on to state that the Council has "adopted the quantitative standards" set out in that study. Whilst this statement may be true in respect of the Council's Leisure Department's function, it does not appear to be true in terms of the Council's planning functions, because the Open Space Study does not appear to have been adopted as SPD, and nor does there ever appear to have been any consultation on its findings.

As a piece of work to support the Council in its leisure services function, the report may well have merit. As a piece of work to support the application of an open space standard for planning purposes, the analysis is severely lacking in rigour, not least because in many instances the standard is not based on evidence of need, but on the perceptions of respondents to a survey, and also because in many instances the rationale behind the suggested targets simply makes no sense.

So for example:

* Parks and Gardens - for this item, the results of the survey suggest no shortage of provision. There is some concern regarding a lack of access in East Rother, although the analysis suggests this is almost negligible (0.04ha per 1000 population). In any event, there is a proposal for a new Country Park, not referred to in the analysis for Parks and Gardens, to the east of Bexhill which would make a major contribution towards increased provision).

Within the analysis presented in Appendix Gi for Parks and Gardens, the only rationale put forward at all for a requirement for additional land for Parks and Gardens appears to come from the 'benchmarking' review, which basically means that the standard exists not because there is any particular need identified in Rother, but because other authorities seek provision. This is very much the antithesis of the local evidence approach required under PPS12.

Irrespective of the above, there does not appear to have been any thought as to how such a standard might be applied in practice, given the general absence of large strategic sites (other than North-East Bexhill, which is related to the new Country Park referred to above). A number of medium sized/small developments, each delivering fragments of notional 'Parks and gardens', would not actually address supply, and since East Sussex County Council is already addressing the provision of a new country park, there is also no justification under the CIL regulations for financial contributions.

* Natural and semi-natural open space - As far as we can ascertain from Appendix G(iv), there is already a considerable surplus of natural and semi-natural green space across the District as a whole. There is also no shortfall identified for any of the sub-areas. So since there is a surplus all round against the Local Authority's standard, there is no justification for seeking more in any circumstances.

The attempt at a justification in Appendix G(iv) is largely unintelligible, but the relevant text states: "Due to the significantly rural nature of the district the standard of 2ha is aimed at new developments of large scale to ensure residential expansion is not at the cost of open space". This appears to suggest that large scale residential expansion necessarily impacts upon the resource of natural/semi-natural open space, but since the existing sites upon which the analysis is based are defined and mapped, the need would only arise in the event of one of the existing defined sites being lost and needing to be replaced, which is an entirely different and site specific response to open space provision, not something to be set out in a generic standard, and certainly not used in a standard when there is an overall surplus of provision.

For both reasons, therefore, this aspect of the "adopted standards" is not justified, appropriate, or CIL compliant.

* Amenity Green Space - The analysis at Appendix G(i) notes that in terms of the survey results, there was "a fairly mixed response" in terms of whether people felt there was too much or too little. The analysis reveals that the NPFA standard for incidental amenity green space would be 0.4 ha per 1000 population.

Notwithstanding that background, Appendix G(i) attempts to justify a standard of 1.73 ha on the basis of:

(a) The erroneous use of the 'benchmarking' approach - i.e. because other authorities have a higher standard, Rother should have one too. Not only is this an unsound methodology in any event, as previously alluded to above, but in this case the 'benchmarking' revealed standards of between 0.5 and 1.6 ha per 1000, and therefore the chosen standard of 1.73 ha exceeds anything revealed by that comparison anyway;
(b) The inexplicable adoption of the current level of provision at Battle, which is 1.73 ha per 1000 population, as the standard to be applied everywhere else in the District.

So in actual fact, the justification for the standard has nothing to do with levels of need or levels of provision, but basically an aspiration that all parts of the District should be like Battle. This approach is incompatible with the evidenced based requirement for policy in PPS12, and CIL requirements.

* Outdoor Sports Facilities - the background to this standard is an NPFA standard that would require 1.62 ha per 1000 population, and an existing level of provision of 2.76 ha per 1000 population. The survey results were mixed, with 52% stating there was inadequate provision, and 48% stating there was enough.

The proposed standard of 2.97 ha per 1000 is acknowledged to be high (compared to other authorities) and is said to be "for broad planning need only", although it is not clear what that means. The justification refers to consultation responses emphasising a lack of provision, although this conclusion does not appear to be borne out from the analysis presented.

Ultimately, the standard of 2.97 ha for the urban areas is chosen solely on the basis that this is the existing level of provision in Rye, and the justification says that the standard is set at this highest level "to protect current provision while attempting to offer standardisation across the District."

Again, therefore, the justification is erroneous, and bears no relationship whatsoever to need and supply. The approach is simply to take the highest rate of existing provision in any one settlement, and apply it to the others to "offer standardisation". This approach is inconsistent with a proper evidence-based approach to policy and the CIL regulations.

In addition to the above, we have reservations in any event regarding the over-reliance placed on the views of surveys in this form of work, firstly because the response sample is very small (705 responses were received, out of a total of 40,300 households in the district, which equates to just 1.7% of all households), secondly because inevitably those that do respond tend to be those people with a particular interest (out of the 5400 surveys issued, what did what did the 4,695 households who didn't respond think?), and thirdly because the information provided is obviously highly subjective. Notwithstanding these significant limitations, the responses to the survey are regularly given undue weight in determining the proposed open space standard.

In the light of the above, the first element of our objection is simply that the "adopted standards" are based upon a wholly inadequate evidence base.

Our second concerns stems from the fact that neither the policy itself nor the supporting text actually sets out what the proposed standard is, and reliance is instead placed upon the background document referred to above to set the standard. This approach means that the standard could in fact change at any time, simply by the Council issuing a revised evidence base, which would not itself be open to any form of consultation or examination. In essence, policy would be being set 'behind the scenes', and the changed policy implemented through CO3 without any recourse for testing. If the Council is to set a standard on open space, then the standard needs to form part of the policy, not part of a 'bottom draw' document.

Thirdly, not only is the policy inappropriate in terms of relying on the standards examined above, but the policy does not appear to provide any mechanism by which a surplus of open space in any particular locality can act as mitigation to the provision of new open space. It refers to "adopted standards" being "maintained", but since the adopted standards are in many instances based upon an acknowledged position of surplus, applicants are being required to maintain a surplus, which is contrary to the CIL regulations.